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Beyond the Constitution: Is the New York
Get Legislation Good Law?
Lisa Zornberg*
Introduction
In halacha,' or Jewish law, a civil divorce decree does not
dissolve the bonds of marriage. 2 Rather, in order for a husband
and wife to be religiously divorced, the husband must give his
wife a bill of divorce, called a get.3 Without a get a Jewish woman cannot remarry and is condemned as an adulteress if she
has sexual relations with other men. 4 Moreover, any children
she bears from a subsequent relationship are branded
mamzerim, children born of an adulterous relationship who are
* Attorney in the litigation department of Sonnenschein, Nath & Rosenthal in
New York City. B.A., American History, Harvard University, 1991; J.D., Harvard
University, 1994.
My sincere thanks to Todd Rakoff, Ralph Michael Stein, Michael A. Bamberger and John J. Patton as well as the many members of the Jewish community
who took the time to share with me their thoughts on the agunah problem and the
New York get legislation.
EditorialNote: Appendix A contains profiles of all commentators interviewed
in the course of my research, as well as their affiliated organizations. Please refer
to it freely as a way to keep track of the many commentators quoted throughout
this article. Unless noted otherwise, all quotes by these individuals come directly
from these interviews.
1. Alternate spelling: halachah.
2. In Jewish law, a marriage can be dissolved in one of only two ways: through
the death of a spouse or by the deliverance of a get. Irving Breitowitz, The Plight of
the Agunah: A Study In Halacha, Contract,and the FirstAmendment, 51 MD. L.
REV. 312, 319 (1992).
3. Significantly, only those Jews who adhere strictly to the halacha consider
themselves bound by the get requirement. Although the countless varieties of Jewish religious practice in the United States defy categorization, the three most recognized "movements" of Judaism continue to be the Orthodox, Conservative, and
Reform. Of these, only the first two consider themselves bound by the dictates of
Jewish law. The Reform Movement, which considers itself to be "guided", not
bound, by halacha, abandoned the get requirement in 1869 (recognizing a civil divorce as sufficient to dissolve the religious union). Linda S. Kahan, Note, Jewish
Divorce and Secular Courts: The Promise of Avitzur, 73 GEO. L.J. 193, 198 n.37
(1984); J. David Bleich, Jewish Divorce: Judicial Misconceptions and Possible
Means of Civil Enforcement, 16 CONN. L. REv. 201, 232 n.96 (1984).
4. GEORGE UoRowrIz, THE SPIMT OF JEWISH LAW 204 (1953).
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barred from marrying freely within the Jewish community. 5
The inability to remarry or bear legitimate children is a devastating prospect, especially among religious Jews, who consider
family and childbearing central to a woman's life. 6 As a result,
a religious woman whose husband disappears, or abandons her,
or refuses to comply with Jewish divorce procedures can spend
years (perhaps the rest of her life) trapped in a "dead" marriage.
A woman in this situation is called an agunah, literally trans7
lated, a "chained woman."
Under halacha, Jewish men can face obstacles to remarriage as well. In addition to requiring that a husband deliver a
get, Jewish divorce law requires that the wife accept it,8 and
occasionally, it is the woman who refuses to cooperate in the get
process. Nevertheless, the sanctions confronting men in this
situation are significantly less severe than those facing women.
They may cohabit with other women without being guilty of
adultery, 9 and any children born from these subsequent relationships do not bear the stigma of mamzerim. Furthermore, by
obtaining the signature of one hundred rabbis, a man can be
halachically "exempted" from the get requirement entirely.1o

5. Considerable stigma is placed by Jewish law upon namzerim (single tense:
mrnamzer), who are to be distinguished from illegitimate children. A mamzer is prohibited from marrying any Jew other than a convert to Judaism or another
mamzer. Significantly, Jewish children born out of wedlock do not bear this disability. Thus, a woman who remarries and bears children with another man prior
to receiving a get jeopardizes not only herself but her children as well. Breitowitz,
supra note 2, at 324 n.48.
6. See Tanina Rostain, PermissibleAccommodations of Religion: Reconsidering the New York Get Law, 96 YALE L.J. 1147, 1166 n.117 (1987) (citing M. MEISELMAN, JEWISH WOMAN IN JEWISH LAW 16-18 (1978) (a woman's primary religious

responsibility in halacha is to nurture Jewish values within the domestic sphere);
R. GORDIS, SEX AND THE FAMILY IN THE JEWISH TRADITION 33 (1967) ("Judaism regards marriage and not celibacy as the ideal human state, because it alone offers
the opportunity for giving expression to all aspects of human nature.")).
7. Translated from Hebrew (plural: agunot).
8. See infra note 30 and accompanying text.
9. Because strict Biblical law permits polygamy, a married man may cohabit
with another woman without committing adultery. Breitowitz, supra note 2, at
324 n.51.
10. This provision, called a Hetter Me'ah Rabbonim ("Dispension of 100
Rabbis"), is available to a man when it is determined that his wife unreasonably
refuses to accept the get. No such mechanism is available to women. Id. at 325.
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Significantly, a man is never considered "chained," as is an
agunah.11
For more than one thousand years, Jewish scholars have
grappled with the tragedy of the agunah and the facial and for12
malistic aspects of gender inequity within Jewish divorce law;
yet, the problem remains unresolved. Moreover, in the last several decades a distinctively modern twist on the problem has
arisen: get extortion. Unlike the historically classic cases-in
which a woman became an agunah because her husband disappeared in a forest and never returned or became missing in battle without witnesses to his death' 3-the modern-day agunah is
often a woman whose husband intentionally abuses the get process for purposes of avarice or spite. 14 The get, in many instances, has become a bargaining chip, with husbands
demanding that their wives "buy" their divorces with money or
other valuable assets, such as property and custody rights. In
other cases, spiteful husbands refuse to give a get on any terms,
abandoning women to the sad plight of a life in a "dead" marriage. In New York State alone, which houses the largest Jewish community in the United States,' 5 one frequently cited
estimate puts the number of agunot at 15,000.16
New York State courts have been confronted by the
problems of agunot for some time. Over the course of the twen11. Edward S. Nadel, New York's Get Laws: A ConstitutionalAnalysis, 27
COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 55, 61 (1993). Because a spouse's recalcitrance has
more severe and permanent implications for women, and because in the large majority of cases women are the victims of a unilateral refusal to grant the get, this
article will focus primarily on how women, rather than men, are affected by abuse
of the get process.
12. See discussion infra notes 28-32 and accompanying text.
13. In Judaism there exists no practice of declaring missing persons dead after a certain number of years have elapsed.
14. The form of agunah often seen today allegedly did not exist in Europe
because there was sufficient community pressure to influence a husband to give a
get. Telephone Interview with Aaron Twerski, Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law
School, Officer, Agudath Israel (Mar. 21, 1994).
15. The Brooklyn and Queens boroughs of New York City are home to nearly
one million Jews. Nationwide it is estimated that three million Jews consider
themselves to be Orthodox or Conservative. Scott Kraft, "Chained Women" Lack
Religious Divorce, Assoc. PREss, Aug. 13, 1983, available in LEXIS, News library,
AP File.
16. See, e.g., Steven Feldman, Grapplingwith Divorce and Jewish Law, GENEsis 2, Apr. 1984, at 15. The 15,000 figure has been highly contested, however. See
infra note 73.
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tieth century, and especially in the last several decades, Jewish
women have often sought state court intervention to assist
them in obtaining religious divorces. 17 In 1983, however, New
York became the first state to address the agunah problem legislatively.18 Lobbying efforts, spearheaded by Agudath Israel, 19
persuaded state legislators that the plight of agunot merited attention. The get bill easily passed both houses of the New York
Legislature, and on August 8, 1983, Governor Mario Cuomo
signed into law section 253 of the Domestic Relations Laws of
New York State, the so-called "get law" or "get statute."20 The
law bars a Jewish plaintiff from obtaining a secular divorce until he or she has removed barriers21 to the other party's remarriage by giving or accepting a get.
From its enactment, the 1983 get statute has been assailed
by academics, civil liberties organizations, and numerous organizations of Reform Judaism as an unconstitutional intrusion
into religious affairs. 22 Many anticipated that the law would be
17. See infra part ll.A.
18. To date, New York remains the only state to have addressed the agunah
problem with legislative measures. See infra note 228.
19. Agudath Israel of America is a national organization that represents over
100,000 Orthodox Jews in the United States. Telephone Interview with Dovid
Zwiebel, Legal Counsel to Agudath Israel (Feb. 21, 1994). See Appendix A for a
description of Agudath Israel.
20. Act of Aug. 8, 1983, ch. 979, [1983] N.Y. Laws 2818, 2819 (codified at N.Y.
DoM. REL. LAw § 253 (McKinney 1986 & Supp. 1995)). In signing the law, Governor Cuomo issued a memorandum stating that the bill "was overwhelmingly
adopted by the State Legislature because it deals with a tragically unfair condition
that is almost universally acknowledged." Governor's Memorandum of Approval
on ch. 979, N.Y. Laws (Aug. 8, 1983), reprinted in [1983] N.Y. Laws 2818, 2819
(McKinney). For the complete text of the law see infra note 134.
21. See infra part II.C for a description of the law's operation.
22. See Nadel, supra note 11, at 83-90 (get law violates Establishment
Clause); Marc Feldman, Jewish Women and Secular Courts:Helping a Jewish Woman Obtain a Get, 5 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 139, 159-60 (1990) (get law violates
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment); Lawrence C. Marshall, Comment, The Religion Clauses and Compelled Religious Divorces:A Study in Marital
and Constitutional Separations, 80 Nw. U. L. REV. 204 (1985) (get law violates
Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses); Lawrence M. Warmllash, The New
York Approach to EnforcingReligious MarriageContracts:From Avitzur to the Get
Statute, 50 BROOK. L. REv. 229 (1984) (get law violates Establishment Clause);
Suzanne M. Aiardo, Note, Avitzur v. Avitzur and New York Domestic Relations
Law Section 253: Civil Response to a Religious Dilemma, 49 ALB. L. REV. 131
(1984) (same); Kahan, supra note 3, at 202-10 (get law violates Establishment and
Free Exercise Clauses, as well as Equal Protection Clause of Fourteenth Amendment); Madeline Kochen, ConstitutionalImplications of New York's 'Get' Statute,
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swiftly struck down on constitutional challenge. However, more
than a decade later, the 1983 get law continues to operate, having survived one early constitutional attack. 23 Nevertheless,
questions remain. Has the 1983 get statute helped agunot?
What, if any, have been the law's other effects on the Jewish
community? Is civil legislation the best way, or even an appropriate way, to resolve the agunah problem?
Analysis of these questions is timely. In 1992, the New
York State Legislature passed a second so-called "getlaw,"24 indicating that the state is continuing to address the agunah
problem with legislative measures. This additional get law
amended New York's equitable distribution statute to allow a
judge, where appropriate, to consider the potential effects of a
woman's religious inability to remarry in dividing marital assets or setting maintenance. 25 The 1992 amendments have
sparked a tremendous controversy in the Orthodox community,
with some groups declaring that the legislation violates Jewish
law and must be immediately repealed or amended. 26 The 1992
27
get law has been criticized on constitutional grounds as well.
This article analyzes the New York get legislation from a
perspective that includes and looks beyond constitutional considerations to see what effects the get laws have had in actual
practice. Part I provides an overview of the religious and sociological dimensions of the agunah problem. Part II recounts
New York's judicial and legislative involvement in addressing
get extortion and discusses the logistical operation of the 1983
N.Y. L.J., Oct. 27, 1983, at 1 (get law violates Establishment, Free Exercise, and
Due Process Clauses).
23. The constitutionality of the 1983 get law was raised in Chambers v. Chambers, 122 Misc. 2d 671, 471 N.Y.S.2d 958 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1983). See infra
notes 193-201 for a discussion of the Chambers case.
24. Act of July 17, 1992, ch. 415, [1992] N.Y. Laws 1212 (codified at N.Y. DOM.
REL. LAw § 236B(5)(h), (6)(d) (McKinney Supp. 1995)). For complete text of this
law, see infra note 148.
25. See infra note 149 and accompanying text for description of the law's
operation.
26. Significantly, Agudath Israel, the chief sponsor of the 1983 get law, is the
organization now leading the charge against the 1992 legislation. Dovid Zwiebel,
the legal counsel to Agudath Israel, said the organization is "a little schizophrenic"
as a result. Telephone Interview with Dovid Zwiebel, Legal Counsel to Agudath
Israel (Feb. 21, 1994).
27. See Nadel, supra note 11, at 78 (the 1992 get law violates the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses of the First Amendment).
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and 1992 get laws. Part III discusses whether New York's get
legislation should be considered "good law." Finally, Part IV
looks at alternative proposals for helping agunot within the
Jewish community and then reassesses, against this backdrop,
whether civil legislation is an appropriate way to address the
agunah problem.
I. Religious and Sociological Dimensions
of the Agunah Problem
A.

Religious Dimensions of the Agunah Problem

The requirement that a man give his wife a get derives from
the Biblical verse in Deuteronomy that provides:
When a man takes a wife and marries her, if it then comes to pass
that she finds no favor in his eyes for he has found something
unseemly in her, he shall write her a document
of divorce and give
28
it to her, and send her out of his house.
Literally read and applied, this Biblical provision grants a man
absolute discretion to divorce his wife. Over the centuries, however, Jewish scholars seeking to protect women in divorce matters have tempered that absolute discretion through the
issuance of takkanot, binding edicts in Jewish law.29 Thus, in
current religious practice a man cannot divorce his wife against
her will; he must voluntarily give the get, and she must voluntarily receive it.3° Secondly, either husband or wife can initiate

divorce proceedings by summoning the other spouse to appear
before a bet din, a rabbinical court. 31 Thirdly, in cases in which
28. Deuteronomy 24:1.
29. A takkana (singular tense) is "a legislative enactment by competent
rabbinical authority to ameliorate the effects of an unduly harsh Biblical or Talmudic law or to enhance the social welfare." Breitowitz, supra note 2, at 317 n.13.
30. Nadel, supra note 11, at 57-58. This restriction dates back to the Tenth
Century, when Rebbenu Gershom, a famous German halachicauthority, issued an
edict prohibiting a husband from divorcing his wife against her will. In an accompanying edict, he banned polygamy, which is Biblically permissible. Id. at 58.
31. A bet din (literally, "house ofjudgment"; alternate spelling: beth din) is the
Hebrew term for a Jewish court of law. In earlier times, rabbinical courts possessed broad enforceable powers over all civil, criminal and religious matters in
the Jewish community. Since the rise of the modern state, however, batei din (plural) have lost their coercive powers and can only decide disputes if parties voluntarily submit to their jurisdiction. Although as a matter of Jewish law, Jews today
are still required to submit all civil and religious disputes to a bet din rather than a
secular tribunal, the issues most frequently resolved by rabbinical courts concern
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rabbinic authorities determine that divorce is required by Jew32
ish law, the bet din can order the husband to give a get.

The issue, however, is not whether the bet din can order
that a get be executed, but whether and how it can enforce that
order. Jewish law places two important restrictions on the
power of rabbinical courts in this regard. First, even if a bet din
determines that a get is required, the power to give a get ultimately resides with the husband, and not even a rabbinical
court can declare a woman divorced absent his consent.3 3 Secondly, in order for a get to be halachically valid the husband
must deliver it voluntarily, of his own free will. A get that results from unlawful coercion, called a get me'useh, is void.3 4 In
light of these halachic restrictions, the issue long debated
among Jewish scholars has been the kinds of pressure that may
be applied to a recalcitrant husband to persuade him to give a
get without upsetting the get's validity.
In the Twelfth Century, Maimonides35 declared that even
severe forms of coercion, such as physical abuse, can be lawfully
applied to a recalcitrant husband. "If one who is obligated by
law to divorce his wife refuses to do so," Maimonides wrote, "a
Jewish court... may beat him until he says, 'I am willing.' At
divorce, religious conversion, and supervision of dietary laws. Kahan, supra note
3, at 193 n.3; Breitowitz, supra note 2, at 326. With regard to the delivery of a get,
the bet din's supervision is not a religious requirement but a practical necessity
due to the complexities involved in the get's proper execution. Bleich, supra note 3,
at 256-58.
32. Not all rabbis agree on what conditions will give rise to a wife's halachic
right to a divorce. Some rabbinic authorities declare that whenever a woman
wants a divorce she deserves to receive one. Other authorities, however, limit a
woman's right to divorce to situations in which she discovers after marriage that
her husband possesses physical defects that prevent cohabitation; is engaged in a
malodorous occupation; is impotent or sterile; refuses to support her; refuses to
cohabit with her; abuses her physically or verbally; causes her to violate a religious
precept; seeks to leave the country permanently; is habitually unfaithful; or becomes an apostate. Breitowitz, supra note 2, at 333 n.80; Nadel, supra note 11, at
59 n.34.
33. But see infra text accompanying notes 309-11 discussing the controversial
approach of Rabbi Moshe Antelman, who asserts that in some situations a bet din
can issue a get of its own accord.
34. Nadel, supra note 11, at 57.
35. Moses ben ("son of") Maimon (1135-1204). Maimonides is considered one
of the greatest Jewish scholars ever to have lived. Born in Spain, he was a distinguished rabbinical authority, codifier of Jewish law, philosopher, and royal physician. Id. at 59 n.38. See also 11 ENCYCLOPAEDIA JUDAICA 754-79 (1972).
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that point, he may write the get and it is a valid contract." 36
Maimonides justified this declaration upon the legal fiction that
all Jewish men really want to comply with religious divorce proceedings. By pressuring a man to give his wife a divorce, he
reasoned, one is only defeating the evil disposition that prevents him from doing so of his own accord, and therefore any get
37
he subsequently delivers is valid.
This theory of "constructive consent" has been widely followed by the rabbinate.3 8 However, while at one time rabbinical
courts would typically have a recalcitrant husband flogged or
stoned until he agreed to give a get, this remedy is neither available nor appropriate in the modern state. "Beating a scoundrel
in the hope of forcing him to shout 'I will' is more likely to provoke a lawsuit for felonious assault," said one commentator. 39
Short of physical coercion, rabbinical courts can pressure a recalcitrant spouse to give a get in other ways. Rabbis can publicly announce the name of a congregant who is unwilling to
religiously divorce his wife, or bar the recalcitrant husband
from receiving honors normally bestowed upon men during worship, such as being called to read the Torah. On Manhattan's
Upper West Side, one group of Orthodox rabbis have banded
together in addressing the agunah problem;4 0 Rabbi Allen
Schwartz recounted that one recalcitrant husband agreed to
give his wife a get only after the rabbis ejected him from each
and every synagogue in the neighborhood. 4 1 In Israel, where
rabbinical courts exercise some state enforcement powers, a bet
36. Mishne Torah, Hilkhot Gerushin 2:20, quoted in Roselyn Bell, Coming
Apart Jewishly, HADAssAH MAG., Mar. 1991, at 22.
37. Nadel, supra note 11, at 59-60.
38. "Rabbinate" is the collective term for the Jewish clerical body.
39. Eliahu Shevin, Plight of Agunos, JEWISH PREss, June 26, 1992, at 35.
Nonetheless, threats by community members to physically abuse a recalcitrant
spouse are not unheard of. Telephone Interview with Alan Dershowitz, Professor
of Law, Harvard Law School (Feb. 16, 1994). Professor Dershowitz, who grew up
in Brooklyn as an Orthodox Jew, recalled: "I know when I was a kid, the story
always went around that, when in a particular Hassidic community a man would
not give a woman a get, a group of tough Hassidim would corner him in a hallway
or a backyard somewhere, and say, 'Look, you have a choice. Your wife is either
going to be a widow or a divorcee.'" Id.
40. See Allen Schwartz, Responding to RecalcitrantHusbands(Letter), JEWISH
PRESS, May 15, 1992, at 73.
41. Telephone Interview with Allen Schwartz, Orthodox Rabbi (Mar. 31,
1994). Rabbi Schwartz recounted:
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din can recommend that the state incarcerate a man for his refusal to give a get.42 Furthermore, legislation in Israel, passed
earlier this year, dramatically expanded the power of rabbinical
courts to pressure recalcitrant spouses through civil
43
restrictions.
Finally, if a man repeatedly ignores the summons to appear
before a bet din, the rabbinical court can issue a seruv, analogous to a contempt of court order. The seruv no longer carries
legal sanction, but its moral weight authorizes community
members to pressure the recalcitrant spouse in numerous ways,
including organized efforts to telephone him, contact important
people in his life, avoid social interactions with him, and picket
his home or business. 44 The Jewish Press, for instance, publishes a regular column, entitled, "Chained: The Agunah Saga,"
that publicly scorns Jewish men who refuse to give their wives
45
religious divorces.
This guy showed up in my shul [synagogue] one time, and there were over
700 people in shul. In front of everybody, two people walked up the aisle
and escorted him out. He didn't even have to be told, he knew what they
were saying. And I got big time heat for asking him to leave shul on shabbas [Sabbath]. And I said, "You know what? I went easy on him. I should
have announced to the shul: You see that man walking out? He won't give
his wife a get."

Id.
42. See Haskel Lookstein, PrenuptialAgreements: The Solution for Women
Seeking a Religious Divorce, JEWISH PRESS, June 19, 1992, at 4, 48 (Israeli imprisonment method helps defer get extortion). But see Goldie Wachsman, No End to
Despairof Chained Wife, JEWISH J., Apr. 14, 1989, at 2 (imprisonment of recalcitrant spouses in Israel underutilized).
43. The Israeli bill gives rabbinical courts the ability to prevent a recalcitrant
spouse from leaving the country, receiving a state-issued passport, receiving a
driver's license, being appointed to public office, practicing any profession that requires a license, and opening a bank account or using a credit card. Jan-Uwe Ronneburger, Israel'sWould-be Divorcees' Thorny Road to Success, DEUTSCHE PRESSEAGENTUR, Mar. 22, 1995 available in LEXIS, News Library, NON-US file. In extreme cases, the new law allows a rabbinical court to impose a jail term of up to ten
years on the recalcitrant husband as a "kind of coercive detention." Id. A similar
pending bill would impose these sanctions on recalcitrant wives as well. Evelyn
Gordon, Same Penaltyfor Goose or Gander Who Refuses Divorce, JERUSALEM PoST,
Mar. 30, 1995, at 3.
44. Breitowitz, supra note 2, at 326-27. Even absent a seruv, members of the
community can apply pressure to a recalcitrant spouse. However, the official endorsement of the rabbinical court can make such pressure more effective. Id.
45. See, e.g., Chained: The Agunah Saga, JEWISH PRESS, July 30, 1993, at 38.
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Community pressure is also the primary tactic used by
grass roots organizations in New York and elsewhere to assist
agunot. In New York City, three organizations-Getting Equitable Treatment (G.E.T.), Get Free, and AGUNAH-incorporate community pressure into their normal operations. 46 "We
will do whatever we can.., to convince the recalcitrant spouse
[to give a get]," said Gloria Greenman, G.E.T.'s founder, adding
that the organization does not employ tactics of physical coercion.4 7 According to Yehuda Levin, a caseworker at Get Free,
while community pressure is no "miracle solution," it can often
be effective. "It's a question of perseverance and being in the
right place at the right time," he said.48
At least two types of coercion, however, are considered to
produce invalid gittin. The first is the imposition of direct financial penalties upon a man for his recalcitrance. 49 The second is the compulsion of a get by a secular court.50 Significantly,
in Jewish law, pressure that may be lawfully applied to a recalcitrant spouse by a bet din is considered unlawful when applied
by a secular judge. 5 1 This does not mean, however, that secular
court involvement in Jewish divorce matters will automatically
invalidate a get. To the contrary, rabbinic authorities approve
the secular court's coercion of a recalcitrant spouse when two
conditions are met: (1) a bet din has previously determined that
a divorce is required by Jewish law; and (2) the secular court
does not itself compel the husband to execute a get, but rather
compels him to comply with the order of the bet din.52 Thus, if a
46. See Appendix A for organizational profiles.
47. Georgia Dullea, Orthodox Jewish Divorce: The Religious Dilemma, N.Y.
TIMES, July 5, 1982, at A40.
48. Telephone Interview with Yehuda Levin, Caseworker, Get Free (Mar. 14,
1994).
49. This restriction plays a central role in the opposition of many rabbis to the
1992 get legislation. See infra notes 238-40 and accompanying text.
50. Nadel, supra note 11, at 60 ("[S]ecular courts may not force a husband to
give a get, and if they do, the resulting get is an invalid get me'useh.").
51. See Stuart Vincent, Rabbis Won't HearDivorce, NEWSDAY, May 17, 1989,
at 21 (reporting Brooklyn case in which three batei din refused to officiate the
delivery of a husband's get because they believed he was acting under the unlawful
coercion of a civil order to do so).
52. Bleich, supra note 3, at 235. Bleich explains that
[elven when Jewish law mandates the husband to give a get, it must be executed pursuant to an order of a rabbinical tribunal; that tribunal is empowered to request a civil court to enforce its decree. The action of a civil court
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secular court acts as the agent of a bet din in coercing the husband to give a get, the ensuing get is halachically sound. However, if the secular court acts independently (for instance, if a
secular judge orders the execution of a get absent prior determination by a bet din that a get is required), the ensuing get is
invalid-even if a bet din would indeed have found a get to be
53
required by Jewish law.

These halachic nuances are critical because they constitute
the foundational principles which any secular attempts to address the agunah problem must take into account. As the following sections will demonstrate, in order to succeed on a
practical level, civil legislation designed to help agunot must
pass not only constitutional muster, but halachic muster as
well.
B. Sociological Dimensions of the Agunah Problem
While the problem of get extortion is a problem of individual actors who abuse Jewish divorce procedures, larger social
forces at work have contributed to its relatively recent rise.
First and foremost, the agunah problem must be viewed in light
of the spiraling divorce rate among American Jews toward the
national rate of 40 to 50 percent.5 4 Between 20,000 and 30,000
Jewish couples divorce annually in the United States, about
fourteen percent of American Jews have been divorced at some
time, and about seven percent are currently divorced. 55 In addition, since the 1960s divorce has significantly impacted the Orthodox community. As the number of traditionally observant
divorcing couples increases, so too does the likelihood-and efunder most circumstances will be deemed ancillary to the decree of the ecclesiastical body and therefore valid.
Id. at 235-36.
53. Dovid Zwiebel called the relationship between civil and rabbinical courts
"an enormously complicated issue" which has generated both discussion and debate in the halachiccommunity. Telephone Interview with Dovid Zwiebel, Legal
Counsel to Agudath Israel (Feb. 21, 1994).
54. Lookstein, supra note 42, at 4 (estimating that one in three marriages
between Jews now ends in divorce).
55. KAYAMA, DESCRIPTION OF OPERATIONS (on file with Pace Law Review) (citing 1990 National Jewish Population Study). The study was commissioned by the
Council of Jewish Federations and undertaken with the City University of New
York. It was the first major study of its kind conducted in 20 years. Id.
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fectiveness-of get extortion. 56 Indeed, as one commentator
notes, "it is precisely because the husband knows that a get is
57
needed that he is able to use it as a bargaining chip."
But rising divorce rates are not solely to blame. A second
explanation attributes the problem of get extortion to the weak
position of rabbinical courts in the modern state.58 Because
rabbinical courts no longer employ severe sanctions, such as the
flogging of recalcitrant husbands, men can flout the bet din's
order that they execute gittin, and get away with it. Moreover,
such men can still divorce and remarry civilly. The result, concludes one commentator, is that the Jewish woman who wants
to follow religious divorce procedures ends up a victim of the
modern state: "She is left with all the handicaps inherited from
thousands of years of the history of Jewish law, and is prevented from benefiting from the protections which have been
created on her behalf by the Jewish courts through the
centuries." 59
Yet another explanation attributes the current agunah
problem in part to the weakening of the Jewish community
through urbanization and increased mobility. Given the ease
with which individuals can move among distinct Jewish communities, recalcitrant spouses can often escape the community
pressure that might otherwise persuade them to give a get.
Particularly in New York City, Isaac Skolnik commented, a recalcitrant husband
can run from here to there. If he's thrown out of one community
he can go to another-that's the reality. It's not like the old days
where everybody knew everybody else. If you have a problem like
56. Dullea, supra note 47, at A40 ("[L]eaders of Orthodox Judaism say it is
only in recent years that the marriages in their largely cohesive community have
been breaking up in significant numbers. With the rise in the divorce rate, rabbis
say, has come an increase in complaints of unethical conduct by parties to divorce,
mostly husbands."); Lookstein, supra note 42, at 4 (given increased divorce rate,
"the opportunities ... for vengeful and hateful oppression by a former spouse are
far greater today than they were 40 years ago when divorce was relatively rare").
57. Breitowitz, supra note 2, at 395.
58. The political and legal disempowerment of rabbinical courts dates back to
the period following the French Revolution, when Jews were required to sacrifice
the autonomy of their rabbinical courts in exchange for political citizenship. EDWARD M. GERSHFIELD, THE JEWISH LAW OF DIVORCE 14-15 (1967); Breitowitz, supra
note 2, at 326. See also supra note 31.
59. GERSHFIELD, supra note 58, at 16.
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this in Kansas City, you can deal with it a little differently be60
cause the guy can't run.
Other commentators, however, place the greatest blame for
the current agunah problem upon the rabbinate, for failing to
seriously address the issue. The problem, they say, is not that
rabbis and rabbinical courts lack power, but rather that they
have been reluctant to use their power to help agunot. Adhering to this view is AGUNAH, an organization initially founded
to help individual agunot that now devotes the bulk of its energies to rabbinic reform:
We used to hold demonstrations against individual men, but a
number of years ago we completely changed the focus of our organization when we realized that it was not the individual men
who were the problem but the rabbinate as a whole. What we are
basically doing now is attacking the Orthodox rabbinate in very
serious ways, pointing the finger at them, because they are the
guilty ones. They could create a different climate so6 there would
no longer be agunot. There is no question about it. 1
While some attribute the New York rabbinate's failure to collectively address the agunah problem to the absence of any central
rabbinic authority in the Orthodox community,6 2 AGUNAH rejects this explanation, asserting that rabbis have been slow to
respond to get extortion because it is a problem that primarily
victimizes women. 63 "Halacha never appears in a vacuum,"
60. Telephone Interview with Isaac Skolnik, Director, Kayama (Feb. 28,
1994). Similarly, Allen Fischer remarked that, "Community pressure only works if
the person is religious, and even then, he can go down the block to the next shul
[synagogue]." Telephone Interview with Allen Fisher, Orthodox Attorney (Mar. 7,
1994).
61. Telephone Interview with Rivka Haut, Director, AGUNAH, Founder,
ICAR (Mar. 6, 1994).
62. "We have no one great halachicleader that commands the respect of the
entire spectrum of the Orthodox community," said Rabbi Kenneth Auman, consequently forecasting slim prospects of Orthodox rabbis achieving consensus on any
innovative halachic approach to the agunah problem. Telephone Interview with
Kenneth Auman, Orthodox Rabbi, Rabbinical Advisor to the G.E.T. Organization
(Mar. 2, 1994). According to Rabbi Auman, the one great halachicleader in New
York who did command universal respect was the late Rabbi Moshe Feinstein. He
said that Rabbi Feinstein's death in 1986 left a void in the leadership of the Orthodox community that has not been filled.
63. See Honey Rackman, Getting a Get: How Some Husbands Are Blackmailing Their Wives-And Getting Away With It, MOMENT, May 1988, at 36 (declaring
that, "Ostrich-like, some Orthodox rabbis have even suggested that there is no
problem. They maintain that they are dealing satisfactorily with the individual
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said Rivka Haut, Director of AGUNAH, "and if you look in general at the history of halacha in the modern world, in every single area other than this one, where it's only women who are
suffering, halacha has managed to keep pace very well." 64 Haut
noted that the directors of AGUNAH consider themselves "Torah feminists" and are viewed by many in the Orthodox community as "bad girls" due to their high visibility in challenging the
65
rabbinate.
Where rabbis have failed to address get extortion, women in
the Orthodox community have often done so on their own.
High-profile neighborhood demonstrations on behalf of agunot
are not uncommon and have attracted media attention in recent
years. 66 In one particularly well-publicized event, a group of
Orthodox women in Canada ceased all sexual relations with
their husbands until a particular man in the community agreed
to give their friend a get.6 7 But such initiatives by Orthodox wo-

men remain the exception, not the rule. According to Chaya
Cooper, Assistant Director of Get Free, most Orthodox women
cases that come before them. With their best handwringing gesture, they gently
shoo from their presence "feminist" troublemakers, with the condescending assurances that they too are deeply troubled and suffer sleepless nights but cannot
change the law").
64. Telephone Interview with Rivka Haut, Director, AGUNAH, Founder,
ICAR (Mar. 6, 1994). Haut said the example she always gives of halachic adaptation to modern circumstances is the issue of finance. "Nobody is disadvantaged
financially because the Torah, in a very clear statement, says that a Jew can't take
interest from another Jew. The banking system in Israel works perfectly." Id.
65. Id. Haut said that although AGUNAH is a small organization, numbering
fewer than 50 members, "in New York we have a very loud voice. The rabbis all
know of us. They know enough to say terrible things about us, and they feel
threatened by us because we have no respect for them." Id. At the organizational
level, G.E.T., AGUNAH, and ICAR were all founded by women, and women continue to hold key leadership roles in those organizations.
66. See Breitowitz, supra note 2, at 330 n.71 (noting that "[iln recent years,
women themselves have organized support groups to exert pressure on unwilling
husbands"). See also Coalition Helps 'Chained Women,' GAzrE (MoNTREAa),
Mar. 1, 1993, at F1 (reporting that on March 4, 1994 Jewish women in Montreal
and other cities around the world planned a fast in support of agunot); Peter
Hellman, PlayingHard to Get: Orthodox Jews and the Women Who Have Trouble
Divorcing Them, N.Y. MAGAZINE, Jan. 25, 1993, at 40 (reporting women's protest
in Brooklyn in support of an agunah).
67. Breitowitz, supra note 2, at 330 n.71 (citing JEwIsH PREss, Oct. 26, 1979
(Magazine), at M41). Their friend's husband had been holding out for $25,000 in
exchange for a get, but he was quickly prevailed upon to execute the get free of
charge.
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prefer to keep a low profile and "stay out of the limelight."68 In
fact, Rivka Haut compared the reactions of Orthodox women to
get extortion to an "underground":
Just walk into a supermarket in Flatbush and start talking about
agunot. You will find that women will come over and express
their very, very deep anger at the situation. But the women don't
know what to do about it; they don't have power in the Orthodox
world; they're. not important in shuls; they're not in control of the
money. There's no meaningful way for women to express their
displeasure. 69
Haut added that part of AGUNAH's goal is to channel women's
70
anger into reform efforts.
Although its feminist attributes cannot be ignored, the
agunah problem is not just a woman's issue. Beyond its impact
upon women, the inequity created by Jewish divorce law is a
community-wide problem that hurts entire families and causes
innocent children to bear the stigma of mamzerim. Furthermore, national media attention to the issue has often embarrassed Judaism, depicting it as an unfair system unable to
resolve a serious endemic problem. 71 "Any Jewish legalist or jurist who wants to stand up and say the Jewish law is a just
system needs to fix this," said Norma Baumel Joseph. 72 Others
share this view.
C.

Quantificationof the Agunah Problem

How many agunot are there in New York State? Estimates
have ranged dramatically, from a few hundred in the entire
United States to 150,000 in New York State alone. 73 According
68. Telephone Interview with Chaya Cooper, Assistant Director, Get Free
(Mar. 14, 1994).
69. Telephone Interview with Rivka Haut, Director, AGUNAH, Founder,
ICAR, (Mar. 6, 1994).
70. Id.

71. Dovid Zwiebel, Tragedy Compounded: The Aguna Problemand New York's
ControversialNew "Get Law," JEWISH OBSERVER, Sept. 1993, at 2.
72. Telephone Interview with Norma Baumel Joseph, Founder and President,
ICAR (Mar. 21, 1994).
73. Dullea, supra note 47, at A40 (citing 150,000 agunot in New York State
alone). In stark contrast, see RABBI MENDEL EPSTEIN, A WoMAN'S GuIDE TO THE
GET PaocEss 4 (1989) (claiming that no more than 50 women in the United States
meet the basic definition of agunah). See also John McQuiston, Jewish Divorce
Law Plagues Wives, N.Y. TmiiEs, Dec. 28, 1986, at B35 (estimating 15,000 agunot in
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to Deborah Eifferman, reliable statistics are almost impossible
to come by, in large part due to the privacy of the matter: "Prior
to the time that a woman gets her divorce very few are ready to
come out in the open. Once they get their divorce they want to
forget about it ....

We only see the tip of the iceberg."74

The caseloads of organizations that help agunot provide
some indication of the numbers involved. G.E.T. reports having
helped 500 clients achieve divorces since 1979; 75 Get Free has

concluded approximately 27 gittin since its establishment in
1992 and has 70 to 80 active cases on file; 76 AGUNAH, which
now refers individual cases out to other organizations, reports
77
that it receives two or three calls for assistance each week.
But these figures are underinclusive for two reasons. First,
they reflect only those agunot who decide to "go public" with
their situation and seek organizational assistance. Second,
these organizational caseloads fail to account for those women
who have obtained gittin, but only after yielding to the extortionate demands of their recalcitrant spouses.
Given the lack of hard numbers, the primary source of
"data" regarding agunot has been anecdotal; indeed, the fact
that so many members of the Orthodox community either know
an agunah personally or have a story to tell of one may be the
best indication of the extent of the problem. 78 Accounts of women's efforts to obtain gittin, such as those that follow, have
captured local and national public attention over the past
decade:
* "It

was the worst time in my life," recalled Rachel (not her real

name). "He basically put me in prison for a year." An Orthodox
Jew in her 40s, Rachel is one of the growing number of women
New York State). It has been suggested that the New York Times report of 150,000
agunot in New York State may have been a typographical error. Breitowitz, supra
note 2, at 316 n.6. Nonetheless, the range of projections is vast.
74. Telephone Interview with Deborah Eifferman, International Vice President, ICAR (Mar. 2, 1994).
75. Id.
76. Information provided by Yehuda Levin, Caseworker, Get Free.
77. Information provided by Rivka Haut. See Appendix A.
78. Rackman, supra note 63, at 35 (declaring that "[olne could fill as many
volumes as there are books of the Talmud (20, and they are massive) with tearful
sagas of Jewish women waiting for gittin from tormenting husbands who dangle
the get on a string of preposterous demands, as a cat might toy with a mouse before
devouring it.").
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who have suffered a uniquely Jewish twist on the general nastiness of divorce ....
Ultimately, Rachel got her get, after she
79
agreed to give her recalcitrant spouse $150,000.
*

In one case, a guy came to see me, and I threw the gentleman
out. For eighteen years the guy wouldn't give her a get. I mean
he put his life away, he put his life on hold. He buried himself
and he buried her....

There's a famous expression Sampson

said when he brought down the temple: I'm going to kill myself

80
but kill them too.

Shira's get is nowhere in sight: Her former spouse asked for
$100,000, then $1 million, and finally her father's pension. In
addition, he is demanding full custody and has said he will submit to a bet din only if all the terms of the divorce-settlement,
custody-are retried through the rabbinical court.8 '
* I had a consultation with a woman and three rabbis. She had to
raise $40,000 to give her husband in order for him to give her a
get. The reason he wanted $40,000 was that his brother was
going into business and he needed this money to start a business. And of course I was appalled by it because this lady was
going to have to work probably for the rest of her life to pay off
this $40,000. She was an office worker who made about $250 a
week, so you can guess how long it was going to take her to pay
back the loan that she had to take out to do this. I took her
aside and I said, "Now listen, you know for $5,000 I know this
guy who'll kill him for you and you'll really be ahead of the
82
game." Obviously, I was joking, but I was really angry.
* It's a crazy thing that we don't have figures, but we find agunot
in the weirdest places. My friend, who's another director of
AGUNAH, told me last week that she walked into the bakery
wearing her button that says "free agunot now" and the woman
behind the counter who was helping her saw the button and
started to cry. She's a woman in her sixties and she's still an
agunah.... They're all over the place. Within the radius of
three or four blocks of my house I know five or six agunot that
are not generally known in the community. For whatever rea*

79. Patricia W. Biederman, When A Jewish Divorce Is Really Hard To Get,
L.A. Tms, May 17, 1992, at J4. See also Kraft, supra note 15 (in which a lawyer
relates how a client's father paid $100,000 in exchange for his daughter's get).
80. Interview with Allen Fisher, Orthodox Attorney (Mar. 7, 1994).
81. Roselyn Bell, Coming Apart Jewishly, HADASSAH, Mar. 1991, at 23.
82. Telephone Interview with Harvey Jacobs, Matrimonial Lawyer (Mar. 7,
1994).
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son they're just quiet about it. But they've gone for years without a get.83
It was stories like these that twice within the last decade inspired the New York State Legislature and Governor Mario
Cuomo to enact civil legislation designed to help agunot. The
next three sections will assess the operation and effectiveness of
their legislative efforts.
II.

New York State's Involvement in the Agunah Problem:
A Judicial and Legislative History

New York State, like virtually all other states, recognizes
religious marriages by according civil validity to a marriage ceremony performed by an authorized minister or clergyman.84
There is no such civil recognition of religious divorce. State
court judges are the exclusive state agents authorized to dissolve marriage unions.8 5 Consequently, prior to the passage of
the 1983 get statute, the state regarded civil and religious divorce as two entirely unrelated affairs; the granting of one had
no impact upon the granting of the other.8 For agunot, this
meant that a woman possessed no automatic legal recourse
when her husband refused to grant her a get.
Women who have sought the aid of New York courts in obtaining gittin have thus done so on a variety of legal theories,
ranging from express and implied contract, to fraud, tort and
equity. 7 While New York courts have been largely sympathetic
to these appeals, they have also recognized that judicial intervention raises constitutional difficulties. This section will
sketch the history of New York's judicial involvement in "get
83. Telephone Interview with Rivka Haut, Director, AGUNAH, Founder,
ICAR (Mar. 6, 1994).
84. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAw § 11(1), (7) (McKinney 1986 & Supp. 1995).
85. See generally N.Y. DoM. REL. LAw § 160(6) (McKinney 1986).
86. Breitowitz, supra note 2, at 321. Similarly, in the eyes of those who adhere to the halacha, only the delivery of a get can dissolve the marriage union for
religious purposes. The fact that a couple may have already obtained a civil divorce is of no consequence. Id. Consequently, many agunot today have already
obtained civil divorces, but are unable to remarry because they have not received a
get.
87. See, e.g., Weiss v. Goldfeder, N.Y. L.J., Oct. 26, 1990, at 21 (Sup. Ct.
Queens County Oct. 26, 1990) (holding that withholding of a get constituted the
tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress).
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cases" before turning to the enactment of the 1983 and 1992 get
laws.
A.

Getting a Get in the Civil Courts
1.

Enforcement of Private Agreements

Most get cases have involved women seeking specific performance of an express contractual agreement between the
spouses. In Koeppel v. Koeppel, the first New York State case of
its kind, the husband and wife had signed a prenuptial agreement requiring both spouses to appear before a bet din in the
event of divorce.8 8 When Mr. Koeppel refused to honor the
agreement, his wife sued. Although the court found the agreement to be valid, it held that the provision in question was too
vague to support an order of specific performance. 89
Marguiles v. Marguiles, the second get case to arise in the
New York courts, involved a husband who promised in open
court to give his wife a get and later refused.90 The appellate
court did not order specific performance of the get's delivery,
but, after vacating the trial court's more severe imposition of a
fifteen-day jail term on the husband, upheld a fine imposed
upon him for contempt of court.9 1
In the cases of Rubin v. Rubin92 and Pal v. Pal,93 the courts
"acted" by refusing to grant any affirmative legal request of the
recalcitrant spouse. In Rubin, a case in which the wife
breached an agreement to accept a get, the court refused to enforce the support provisions of the parties' separation agreement until the wife fulfilled her contractual obligation to
88. 138 N.Y.S.2d 366 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1954), aff'd, 3 A.D.2d 853, 161
N.Y.S.2d 694 (2d Dep't 1957).
89. Id. at 371.
90. 42 A.D.2d 517, 517, 344 N.Y.S.2d 482, 484 (1st Dep't 1973).
91. Id. Some commentators have interpreted the willingness of the appellate
court in Marguiles to authorize fines but not jail terms to mean that New York
courts will allow enforcement ofget agreements through measures less severe than
incarceration. See IRWN H. HAUT, DIVORcE IN JEWISH LAW AND LIFE 73-74 (1983).
This hypothesis has since been disproved. See Kaplinsky v. Kaplinsky, 198 A.D.2d
212, 603 N.Y.S.2d 574 (2d Dep't 1993) (upholding lower court's imposition of term
of imprisonment upon recalcitrant husband).
92. 75 Misc. 2d 776, 348 N.Y.S.2d 61 (Fain. Ct. Bronx County 1973).
93. N.Y. L.J., July 25, 1973, at 13 (Sup. Ct. Kings County July 25, 1973),
rev'd, 45 A.D.2d 738, 356 N.Y.S.2d 672 (2d Dep't 1974).
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cooperate in obtaining a religious divorce. 94 Similarly, in Pal, in
which the husband reneged on his promise in open court to appear before a bet din, the court dismissed the husband's motion
to hold his wife in contempt for failure to comply with the visita95
tion provisions in the judgment of divorce.
Although the courts in these cases took some action against
the recalcitrant spouse and recognized the validity of an agreement to obtain a get, none granted the actual remedy requested-specific performance of an express contractual
provision to give a get or appear before a bet din. With the exception of Koeppel, in all of the above cases the courts duly
noted either potential constitutional or halachic problems in requiring specific performance of a religious requirement. 96 It
was not until 1976 in Waxstein v. Waxstein, that a New York
court ordered specific performance of an agreement requiring
97
the husband to give a get.
2.

Theory of Implied Contract

In a second line of cases, absent express agreement between the spouses, women have sought civil enforcement of the
get based on an implied obligation set out in the ketubah.98 The
ketubah is the traditional Jewish marriage contract in which a
groom agrees to a set of provisions, including the following: "Be
unto me for a wife, according to the laws of Moses and Israel,
94. Rubin, 75 Misc. 2d at 783, 348 N.Y.S.2d at 67.
95. Pal, 45 A.D.2d at 739, 356 N.Y.S.2d at 673.
96. In Pal, the appellate court succinctly stated that a secular court lacks authority to convene a rabbinical tribunal. Id. In Marguiles, the court raised constitutional concerns, but apparently considered them to be preempted by the halachic
concern that ordering the husband to execute a get would in any event render the
get invalid. Marguiles, 42 A.D.2d at 517, 344 N.Y.S.2d at 484. In Rubin, in which
the trial court directly raised the First Amendment difficulties of ordering the execution of a get, the court concluded that where performance of a religious act constitutes a condition precedent to an agreement, no First Amendment problems
arise from the court's simple refusal to enforce the agreement's contingent obligations if that condition has not been satisfied. Rubin, 75 Misc. 2d at 782, 348
N.Y.S.2d at 67. For a discussion of the constitutional implications of these get
cases, see Bleich, supra note 3, at 227-41.
97. 90 Misc. 2d 784, 395 N.Y.S.2d 877 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1976), aff'd, 57
A.D.2d 863, 394 N.Y.S.2d 253 (2d Dep't 1977).
98. Literally, "writing." Dating back to Talmudic times, the traditional
ketubah was instituted to protect the bride by obligating the groom to pay her a
specific sum in the event of death or divorce. See Kahan, supra note 3, at 198;
Breitowitz, supra note 2, at 343 n.119.
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and I will work, honor, support and maintain thee in accordance
with the manner of Jewish men who work, honor, support and
maintain their wives in faithfulness. ..

."99

Women have ar-

gued that this language impliedly obligates a husband to deliver a get to his wife when a divorce is required by Jewish
law. 100

The court in Stern v. Stern agreed.10 ' In Stern, the wife
sued for divorce and the husband counterclaimed, alleging adultery. Relying on expert testimony that Jewish law absolutely
requires a husband to divorce an adulterous wife, the court ordered the man to deliver a get to his wife based on his agreement in the ketubah to act in accordance with "the laws of
Moses and Israel." 10 2 In so holding, the Stern court held that
the ketubah is a valid, binding contract, "a simple agreement
between a man and a woman in contemplation of marriage
[which] .

.

. should be enforced according to the intent of the

parties .... "103
Civil enforcement of the ketubah is problematic for a
number of reasons, however. Due to the ceremonial nature of
the ketubah, it is questionable whether the groom possesses the
99. Nadel, supra note 11, at 64.
100. The firstget case to proceed on a theory of the ketubah was the Canadian
case of Morris v. Morris, 36 D.L.R.3d 447, rev'd, 42 D.L.R.3d 550 (1973). In Morris,
the trial court sustained the argument that the ketubah is a civilly enforceable
contract and ordered the deliverance of a get. Although that holding was reversed
on appeal, the argument has gained ascendancy in a number ofjurisdictions in the
United States. See In re Marriage of Goldman, 554 N.E.2d 1016 (IIl. App. Ct.),
appeal denied, 555 N.E.2d 376 (111. 1990); Burns v. Burns, 538 A.2d 438 (N.J.
Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1987); Minkin v. Minkin, 432 A.2d 665 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div.
1981); Stern v. Stern, 5 Fam. L. Rep. (BNA) 2810 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1979).
101. 5 Faro. L. Rep. (BNA) 2810 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1979).
102. 5 Fam. L. Rep. at 2811. See Steven F. Friedell, The FirstAmendment
and Jewish Divorce: A Comment on Stern v. Stern, 18 J. FAM. L. 525 (1979-1980)
(defending the constitutional validity of the Stern decision).
103. Stern, N.Y. L.J., Aug. 8, 1979, at 13. Prior to Stern, a number of New
York courts had declared the ketubah a valid contract, although not for the purpose of requiring a get. See Hurwitz v. Hurwitz, 216 A.D. 362, 215 N.Y.S. 184 (2d
Dep't 1926); Kaplan v. Kaplan, 69 Misc. 2d 198, 329 N.Y.S.2d 750 (Sup. Ct. Kings
County 1972) But see In re Estate of White, 78 Misc. 2d 157, 158-59, 356 N.Y.S.2d
208, 209-10 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1974) (the ketubah has no legally binding effect); Wener v. Wener, 35 A.D.2d 50, 54, 312 N.Y.S.2d 815, 819 (2d Dep't 1970)
(holding that trial court erred in relying on the ketubah to find child support
obligation).
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requisite intent to make it a legally binding contract. 0 4 Difficulties include that the traditional ketubah is written in Aramaic, often without English translation; 0 5 that it is composed of
"boilerplate" language that may not codify the true wishes of
the marrying couple; 0 6 and that it is signed in a highly emotional setting just moments before the wedding ceremony. 0 7 Finally, even if the ketubah does constitute a civilly enforceable
contract, nowhere does the document mention divorce or a husband's obligation to deliver a get. Some commentators therefore
condemn judges' efforts to read this obligation into the general
requirement that a groom act in "accordance with the laws of
Moses and Israel" as unconstitutional interference with a set of
highly complex religious issues.' ° 8
In 1954, the Conservative Jewish movement tried to eliminate ambiguity and the potential for judicial entanglement by
adding to its "official" form of ketubah an arbitration clause
(known as the Lieberman clause) in which both bride and groom
agree to appear before a bet din at the other's request, and to
abide by any decision rendered by the bet din under penalty of
financial sanction.1 ( 9 This clause, which in effect binds a recal104. Kahan, supra note 3, at 216-17; Nadel, supra note 11, at 65 n.89;
Friedell, supra note 102, at 533; In re Estate of White, 78 Misc. 2d 157, 158-59, 356
N.Y.S.2d 208, 209-210 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1974) (ketubah is ceremonial, not
legal, document).
105. Breitowitz, supra note 2, at 347. "Even where some English words do
appear," Breitowitz states "the legal portions of the ketubah are rarely reproduced
in English," such that a majority of couples are probably ignorant of the ketubah's
substantive legal obligations. Id.
106. Kahan, supra note 3, at 216; Friedell, supra note 102, at 533 ("[lit is part
of a ceremony that the parties may regard as quaint, symbolizing one's connection
with tradition but not an actual legal relationship").
107. See Kahan, supra note 3, at 216-17. Often the ketubah is signed in the
company of celebrating family members and photographers, absent any enumeration of the specific clauses in the document and their legal import. Id.
108. Id.
109. See Nadel, supra note 11, at 66 n.93. The added provision reads:
As evidence of our desire to enable each other to live in accordance with the
Jewish law of marriage throughout our lifetime, we, the bride and bridegroom, attach our signatures to this Ketubah, and hereby agree to recognize
the authority of the Beth Din of the Rabbinical Assembly and the Jewish
Theological Seminary of America, or its duly appointed representatives, as
having authority to counsel us in the light of the Jewish tradition which
requires the husband and wife to give each other complete love and devotion, and to summon either party at the request of the other, in order to
enable the party so requesting to live in accordance with the standards of

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol15/iss3/2

22

19951

BEYOND THE CONSTITUTION

725

citrant spouse to appear before a bet din when summoned, is
significant for agunot, who often have difficulty just getting
their husbands to appear before a rabbinical tribunal.
In the landmark 1983 case ofAvitzur v. Avitzur, the highest
court in New York State upheld the enforceability of the Lieberman clause by a four-to-three margin and specifically ordered
Boaz Avitzur to appear before a bet din. 110 The court in Avitzur
declared that, despite the religious nature of the ketubah, its
arbitration clause could be enforced "solely upon the application
of neutral principles of contract law," thereby avoiding any entanglement of the courts in religious issues.'' The dissent rejected this claim and deemed the ketubah a liturgical document,
the enforcement of which would impermissibly entangle secular
courts in ecclesiastical affairs." 2
Although the Avitzur case has symbolic importance for agunot in New York, its ability to help resolve their problems is
limited. First, because the court's decision only applies to parties bound by the Conservative ketubah, Avitzur has no significance for Orthodox Jews, whose marriage contracts contain no
such arbitration clause." 3 Second, by its explicit terms, Avitzur
Jewish law of marriage throughout his or her lifetime. We authorize the
Beth Din to impose such terms of compensation as it may see fit for failure
to respond to its summons or to carry out its decision.
Id. This clause is called the Lieberman clause after its drafter, Rabbi Saul Lieberman of the Jewish Theological Seminary. Nadel, supra note 11, at 66 n.93; Marshall, supra note 22, at 208 n.26; Breitowitz, supra note 2, at 361-63; Kahan, supra
note 3, at 221 n.175.
110. 58 N.Y.2d 108, 446 N.E.2d 136, 459 N.Y.S.2d 572, cert. denied, 464 U.S.
817 (1983). This case arose prior to the enactment of the get statute later that
year.
111. Id. at 114, 446 N.E.2d at 138, 459 N.Y.S.2d at 574. Writing for the majority, Judge Wachtler analogized the Lieberman clause to an antenuptial provision in which parties agree to arbitrate in a particular forum. "This agreementthe Ketubah," he wrote ,"should ordinarily be entitled to no less dignity than any
other civil contract to submit a dispute to a nonjudicial forum, so long as its enforcement violates neither the law nor the public policy of this State." Id. (citations
omitted).
112. Id. at 116, 446 N.E.2d at 139, 459 N.Y.S.2d at 575 (Jones, J., dissenting).
See Ralph M. Stein, Marriage Contracts Unsuited for Civil Courts, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 25, 1983, at A30 (criticizing the Court of Appeals as being "disingenuous when
it finds that some aspects of the Jewish marriage contract are severable and civilly
enforceable while others are not").
113. See Nadel, supra note 11, at 67 (calling Avitzur "only a partial solution to
the agunah problem" in light of the Orthodox Movement's refusal to accept the
Conservative modification of the ketubah). The Orthodox Movement has rejected
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only requires a recalcitrant husband to appear before a bet din;
it does not require him to deliver a get or to comply with the bet
din's order that he do so. 114 Thus, Avitzur does not help a woman whose husband appears before a religious tribunal but
11 5
nonetheless refuses to grant her a religious divorce.
3.

Non-ContractualTheories

In several get cases, New York courts have resorted to entirely non-contractual theories in addressing get extortion. In
B. v. B., the court scheduled a hearing to determine whether the
husband's conduct in refusing to give his wife a get constituted
fraud. 116 In Weiss v. Goldfeder, the court sustained as a valid
cause of action the claim that a husband's withholding of a get
amounted to tortious conduct, namely intentional infliction of
emotional distress. 117 Finally, on grounds of equitable relief, in
two cases New York courts voided agreements entered into by
women under duress to obtain gittin. In Perl v. Perl, the court
the Lieberman clause on halachicgrounds. Id. But see Breitowitz, supra note 2, at
363 n.227 (stating that the Orthodox Movement's halachic problems with the Lieberman clause could be easily eliminated by revising the provision). See also
Kahan, supra note 3, at 222 (suggesting that the "uncompromising rejection" of the
Lieberman clause by some Orthodox commentators may stem from their unwillingness to recognize the validity of the Conservative Jewish Movement and its
rabbinical tribunals).
114. Avitzur, 58 N.Y.2d at 115, 446 N.E.2d at 139, 459 N.Y.S.2d at 575.
115. But see Breitowitz, supra note 2, at 363-65 (discussing possible theories
upon which the Avitzur holding could be extended to require actual compliance
with the bet din's decision requiring that the husband execute a get).
116. N.Y. L.J., May 4, 1978, at 7 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County May 4, 1978). In B. v.
B., the wife withdrew her opposition to a civil divorce decree based on her husband's agreement to give her a get. However, once the civil divorce judgment was
entered, the husband, a Conservative rabbi, reneged on his promise. The court
responded by scheduling a hearing to determine whether the husband's actions
constituted fraud, a finding of which would have voided the order of civil divorce.
The husband gave his wife a get soon after the judge's action, making the hearing
unnecessary. Id.
117. N.Y. L.J., Oct. 26, 1990, at 21, 31 (Sup. Ct. Queens County Oct. 26, 1990).
The possibility of seeking tort remedies for agunot has received attention. See
Breitowitz, supra note 2, at 397-406; Friedell, supra note 102, at 532; Barbara J.
Redman, Jewish Divorce: What Can Be Done in Secular Courts to Aid the Jewish
Woman?, 19 GA. L. REv. 389 (1985). However, New York courts to date have been
generally reluctant to equate a man's refusal to give his wife a get with tortious
offense. See Perl v. Perl, 126 A.D.2d 91, 96, 512 N.Y.S.2d 372, 376 (1st Dep't 1987)
(rejecting tort theory as valid cause of action against recalcitrant spouse); see also
Breitowitz, supra note 2, at 406-07 (stating that tort remedy, either by statute or
common law, would raise serious halachicproblems).
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voided a property settlement in which a wife had transferred
nearly all marital property to her husband in exchange for a
religious divorce.118 The court stated that
the husband, knowing that his wife was of the Orthodox Jewish
faith and could never remarry or bear children without a [glet,
and aware that only he, under Jewish law, could permit such an
instrument to issue, used this knowledge to crush the wife's
resistance to his extortionate financial demands and that she, because of her desperation to be free and remarry, bear children,
and live a normal life, simply capitulated. 119
Similarly, in Golding v. Golding, which quoted Perl at length,
the court voided a settlement agreement upon finding that the
husband had abused his power to deny the get in negotiating its
terms. 12° The opinion noted that the prospect of not receiving a
get was "particularly terrifying to the plaintiff" because her sis121
ter was an agunah.
Despite the desire of many New York courts to help agunot,
judicial intervention in the get process raises potential constitutional and halachicproblems. Given the complexities of Jewish
law, a court that tries to help an agunahmay unknowingly create a situation in which any get delivered will be deemed invalid.122 However, courts cannot be expected to understand these
doctrinal complexities, 12 and those that try to do so risk entanglement in religious issues. In light of this tension, judicial intervention constitutes an attractive but complicated and
potentially dangerous option for helping agunot.
118. 126 A.D.2d 91, 512 N.Y.S.2d 372 (1st Dep't 1987).
119. Perl, 126 A.D.2d at 93-94, 512 N.Y.S.2d at 374. Writing for the court,
Justice Wallach emphasized that courts possess broad equitable powers in overseeing divorce settlements: "'[Clourts have thrown their cloak of protection about
separation agreements and made it their business, when confronted, to see to it
that they are arrived at fairly and equitably, in a manner so as to be free from the
taint of fraud and duress ...

.'"

Id. at 95-96, 512 N.Y.S.2d at 375-76 (quoting

Christian v. Christian, 42 N.Y.2d 63, 72, 365 N.E.2d 849, 855, 396 N.Y.S.2d 817,
824 (1977)).
120. 176 A.D.2d 20, 23, 581 N.Y.S.2d 4, 6-7 (1st Dep't 1992).
121. Id. at 21, 581 N.Y.S.2d at 5 (quoting New York County Supreme Court's

findings).
122. See supra notes 50-53 and accompanying text.
123. See Bleich, supra note 3, at 220-24 (noting repeated instances of judicial
error and misunderstanding with regard to the nature of the get).

25

728

PACE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 15:703

B. Enactment of the 1983 Get Statute
In 1980, Agudath Israel undertook a major effort to develop
legislative approaches to the agunah problem that would satisfy
both constitutional and halachic mandates. Convening rabbis,
attorneys and legal scholars for a full-day brainstorming session, the organization set in motion the intellectual machinery
that eventually produced the 1983 get statute.'2 Alan Dershowitz recalled the meeting: "Everyone was trying to figure out a
way of coercing without coercing and also a way of getting the
state involved without getting the state involved."12 5 What
emerged was the central concept behind the 1983 get statute,
that the state has a legitimate interest in ensuring that barriers
to remarriage are removed prior to granting spouses a civil divorce. As Nathan Lewin explained, civil divorce is "designed to
sever the parties from the marital relationship and to leave
each free to remarry. The purpose of a divorce decree would
plainly be frustrated if the party securing the divorce were able
126
to restrain the defending party from ever remarrying."
In designing the get statute, the drafters followed the noninterventionist approach taken in Rubin and Pal.127 Instead of
requiring spouses to give or accept a get, courts are directed to
take no action until the party requesting civil divorce voluntarily removes existing barriers to remarriage. By minimizing judicial intervention in this manner, the drafters of the get
statute sought to avoid constitutional and halachic difficulties,
as well as to advance the policy that courts will not confer the
secular benefit of divorce upon any individual who comes before
124. Breitowitz, supra note 2, at 375 n.276.
125. Telephone Interview with Alan Dershowitz, Professor of Law, Harvard
Law School (Feb. 16, 1994).
126. Memorandum from Nathan Lewin, Miller, Cassidy, Larroca & Lewin, to
Assemblyman Sheldon Silver, in Support of A. 6423, June 8, 1983, in Legislative
Bill Jacket, [1983] N.Y. Laws c. 979.
After a bill is passed by both houses of the New York State Legislature,
records of the voting, along with all memoranda submitted in support and opposition to the bill proceed to the Governor's desk for consideration before signing.
This packet, called the "bill jacket," is kept on file at the New York State Archives
in Albany, New York.
127. See supra notes 92-95 and accompanying text. See also Bleich, supra
note 3, at 277-89 (arguing for secular relief of the agunah problem through approach of judicial non-intervention).
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it with "dirty hands" (i.e. who is preventing his spouse from
128

remarrying).
The first get bill, proposed in 1981, easily sailed through
both houses of the New York legislature.129 However, anticipating that Governor Carey would veto the legislation on constitutional grounds, the sponsors withdrew it for further
evaluation. 130 They introduced a slightly revised get bill two
years later, after Mario Cuomo had become Governor.' 3 ' Despite the bill's questioned constitutionality, it passed unanimously in the Senate and by an overwhelming majority in the
Assembly, 32 thanks primarily to the strong political lobby of
New York's Orthodox community and the influence of New York
legislators who were themselves Orthodox Jews (including the
bill's chief sponsor, Sheldon Silver).
The bill proceeded to Governor Cuomo's desk with an impressive list of opponents urging veto of the legislation on constitutional grounds. Among them were the American Jewish
Congress, the Committee on Matrimonial Law of the New York
City Bar Association, the National Federation of Temple Sisterhoods (representing 12,000 Reform Jewish women), the New
York Federation of Reform Synagogues, the New York Civil Liberties Union, and Americans United For Separation of Church
and State. 133 Nonetheless, on August 8, 1983 Governor Cuomo
signed into law section 253 of the Domestic Relations Law, a
128. See Bleich, supra note 3, at 281-82.
129. Breitowitz, supra note 2, at 375 n.276. This bill was primarily authored
by Alan Dershowitz. Id.
130. Id. The bill's chief sponsors were Assemblyman Sheldon Silver and Senator Martin Connor. See Letter from Charles J. Tobin, New York State Catholic
Conference, to Honorable Martin Connor and Honorable Sheldon Silver, (June 23,
1983), in Legislative Bill Jacket, [1983] N.Y. Laws ch. 979.
131. The revised get bill was authored by Nathan Lewin. It differed from the
earlier version in that the original version contained a provision for compulsory
arbitration on the issue of compliance, whereas a revised bill eliminated this provision, relying instead upon a verified affidavit. Breitowitz, supra note 2, at 375
n.276.
132. The Senate passed the 1983 get bill by a margin of 58 to zero. The Assembly passed it by a margin of 136 to 7. Legislative Bill Jacket, [1983] N.Y. Laws
ch. 979 (reporting results of the vote on N.Y.S. 6647, N.Y.A. 6423, 206th Sess.
(1983)).
133. All of these organizations filed memoranda in opposition to the get bill.
Legislative Bill Jacket, [1983] N.Y. Laws ch. 979.
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new statutory provision entitled "Removal of barriers to
remarriage."13
134. N.Y. DoM. REL. LAW § 253 (McKinney 1986 & Supp. 1995). Bernard
Zlotowitz, A Religious Requirement Imposed By Cuomo in '83, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
26, 1984, at A22 (in signing the 1983 get bill "Governor Cuomo bowed to the Orthodox [lobby]"). The law took effect immediately, and was deemed applicable to all
pending annulment and divorce actions at the time of passage. Pinkesz v. Pinkesz,
N.Y. L.J., Dec. 4, 1984, at 13 (Sup. Ct. Kings County Dec. 4, 1984). The complete
text of the 1983 get statute (as amended in 1984) is as follows:
1. This section applies only to a marriage solemnized in this state or in
any other jurisdiction by a person specified in subdivision one of section
eleven of this chapter.
2. Any party to a marriage defined in subdivision one of this section
who commences a proceeding to annul the marriage or for a divorce must
allege, in his or her verified complaint: (i) that, to the best of his or her
knowledge, that he or she has taken or that he or she will take, prior to the
entry of final judgment, all steps solely within his or her power to remove
any barrier to the defendant's remarriage following the annulment or divorce; or (ii) that the defendant has waived in writing the requirements of
this subdivision.
3. No final judgment of annulment or divorce shall thereafter be entered unless the plaintiff shall have filed and served a sworn statement: (i)
that, to the best of his or her knowledge, he or she has, prior to the entry of
such final judgment, taken all steps solely within his or her power to remove
all barriers to the defendant's remarriage following the annulment or divorce; or (ii) that the defendant has waived in writing the requirements of
this subdivision.
4. In any action for divorce based on subdivisions five and six of section
one hundred seventy of this chapter in which the defendant enters a general
appearance and does not contest the requested relief, no final judgment of
annulment or divorce shall be entered unless both parties shall have fied
and served sworn statements (i) that he or she has, to the best of his or her
knowledge, taken all steps solely within his or her power to remove all barriers to the other party's remarriage following the annulment or divorce; or
(ii) that the other party has waived in writing the requirements of this
subdivision.
5. The writing attesting to any waiver of the requirements of subdivision two, three or four of this section shall be filed with the court prior to the
entry of a final judgment of annulment or divorce.
6. As used in the sworn statements prescribed by this section "barrier
to remarriage" includes, without limitation, any religious or conscientious
restraint or inhibition, of which the party required to make the verified
statement is aware, that is imposed on a party to a marriage, under the
principles held by the clergyman or minister who has solemnized the marriage, by reason of the other party's commission or withholding of any voluntary act. Nothing in this section shall be construed to require any party to
consult with any clergyman or minister to determine whether there exists
any such religious or conscientious restraint or inhibition. It shall not be
deemed a "barrier to remarriage" within the meaning of this section if the
restraint or inhibition cannot be removed by the party's voluntary act. Nor
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Operation of the 1983 Get Statute

Strategically, the so-called "get statute" makes no specific
mention of the get or of Judaism. Neutral on its face, it applies
to all persons married in religious ceremonies, whether or not
they are Jewish. 13 5 Conversely, the law excludes from its coverage all persons married in civil ceremonies, even if they are
Jewish. 13 6 Despite its facial neutrality, however, by limiting the
statutory definition of "barrier to remarriage" to "voluntary"
acts, the statute confines its practical application to the delivery
13 7
of the get in Jewish divorce cases.
shall it be deemed "barrier to remarriage" if the party must incur expenses
in connection with removal of the restraint or inhibition and the other party
refuses to provide reasonable reimbursement for such expenses. "All steps
solely within his or her power" shall not be construed to include application
to a marriage tribunal or other similar organization or agency of a religious
denomination which has authority to annul or dissolve a marriage under the
rules of such denomination.
7. No final judgment of annulment or divorce shall be entered, notwithstanding the filing of the plaintiff's sworn statement prescribed by this section, if the clergyman or minister who has solemnized the marriage certifies,
in a sworn statement, that he or she has solemnized the marriage and that,
to his or her knowledge, the plaintiff has failed to take all steps solely within
his or her power to remove all barriers to the defendant's remarriage following the annulment or divorce, provided that the said clergyman or minister
is alive and available and competent to testify at the time when final judgment would be entered.
8. Any person who knowingly submits a false sworn statement under
this section shall be guilty of making an apparently sworn false statement
in the first degree and shall be punished in accordance with section 210.40
of the penal law.
9. Nothing in this section shall be construed to authorize any court to
inquire into or determine any ecclesiastical or religious issue. The truth of
any statement submitted pursuant to this section shall not be the subject of
any judicial inquiry, except as provided in subdivision eight of this section.
N.Y. DoM. REL. LAw § 253.
135. See id. § 253(1).
136. See id.
137. Id. § 253(6). The get statute's drafters cleverly defined "barriers to remarriage" so as to exclude Catholics from the statute's coverage. Catholics face
barriers to religious remarriage as well, but because the annulment that Catholics
must obtain before remarrying within the Catholic Church is considered an act of
the Church, and not a "voluntary" act of the parties themselves, Catholics are excluded the statute's practical coverage. Consequently, in 1983 the New York State
Catholic Conference filed a memorandum stating that it had no objection to the get
bill's enactment. Memorandum from Charles J. Tobin, New York State Catholic
Conference, to Senator Martin Connor and Assemblyman Sheldon Silver, regard-
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As amended in 1984,ls the get statute requires the party
who initiates an action for civil divorce or annulment to do two
things before final judgment can be entered. First, in filing his
or her verified complaint, the plaintiff must allege, "to the best
of his or her knowledge, that he or she has taken or that he or
she will take, prior to the entry of final judgment, all steps
solely within his or her power to remove any barrier to the de139
fendant's remarriage following the annulment or divorce."
Second, prior to judgment, the plaintiff must submit an affidavit
stating that he or she has actually taken the steps necessary to
14
remove the barrier to remarriage.
Two provisions in the get statute guard against the filing of
false affidavits. First, a plaintiff may be criminally liable for the
intentional filing of a false statement. 141 Second, the statute allows the clergyman who performed the wedding ceremony to
counter the plaintiff's affidavit with an affidavit stating that
barriers to the defendant's remarriage still exist.142 In this situation, the clergyman's statement prevails and no final judgment
1
of divorce will be entered. 4
Finally, the statute requires the defendant to reimburse
the plaintiff for reasonable expenses incurred in connection
ing A. 6423 and S. 6647, June 23, 1983, in Legislative Bill Jacket [1983] N.Y. Laws
ch. 979.
138. In August 1984, in response to the Chamberscase, 122 Misc. 2d 671, 471
N.Y.S.2d 958 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1983), see infra notes 193-201 and accompanying text, and to further guard against constitutional impediment, the New York
State Legislature amended the 1983 get statute in two ways. First the amendment
allowed a defendant to waive the statute's requirements in writing. N.Y. DOM.
REL. LAw § 253(3). Second, the 1984 amendment eliminated any need for spouses
to consult religious authorities in determining whether barriers to remarriage exist. Id. § 253(6). Whereas the law originally required a plaintiff to attest that he
or she had taken all steps to remove barriers to remarriage, after amendment
plaintiffs are required to make statements based only on their best "knowledge."
Id. § 253(2).
139. Id. § 253(2).
140. Id. § 253(3). In the case of a conversion divorce, in which the defendant
appears but does not contest the action, both parties must file the required affidavits. Id. § 253(4). A conversion divorce is a separation decree that is changed to a
divorce action.
141. Id. § 253(8).
142. Id. § 253(7).
143. Id. This "clergy veto" provision only applies "if the said clergyman or
minister is alive and available and competent to testify at the time when final
judgment would be entered." Id.
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with.the removal of a barrier to marriage; if the defendant refuses to do so, no barrier to remarriage will be deemed to
exist.'"
D. Enactment of the 1992 Get Law
In operation, the 1983 get statute has an obvious loophole:
because it requires only the plaintiff to remove barriers to remarriage, a recalcitrant spouse who is the defendant in a divorce action can escape the law entirely by simply not
counterclaiming. 14 It is for this reason that in 1992, the New
York State Legislature once again enacted legislation directed
at helping agunot, this time by authorizing a court to take a
party's inability to remarry into account in the context of equitable distribution. 146 Unlike the 1983 get statute, the more extensive 1992 law applies to both plaintiffs and defendants,
regardless of whether the parties were married in a religious
ceremony. Sponsored by Assemblyman Sheldon Silver and Senator Stephan Seland, the bill passed unanimously in both
houses," 47 and was signed by Governor Cuomo on July 17,
1992.148
The 1992 get law amended New York's equitable distribution statute to provide that "the court shall, where appropriate,
144. Id. See also N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 253 commentary at 860 (McKinney
1986).
145. By counterclaiming, a defendant also becomes a plaintiff and so is subject
to the get statute's provisions.
146. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAw §§ 236B(5)(h), 6(d) (McKinney 1986 & Supp. 1995).
See Historic'Get'Bill Signed, JEwISH PREss, July 23, 1992, at 1 (reporting that the
1992 get bill greatly expands the scope of those affected by the 1983 get statute).
147. The Senate vote was 58 to zero. The Assembly vote was 139 to zero.
Legislative Bill Jacket, [1992] N.Y. Laws ch. 415 (reporting vote on N.Y.S. 7863,
N.Y.A. 2098, 215th Sess. (1992)).
148. Act of July 17, 1992, ch. 415, [1992] N.Y. Laws 1212 (codified at N.Y.
DOM. REL. LAW §§ 236B(5)(h), 6(d) (McKinney Supp. 1995)). The complete text of
the 1992 get amendment is as follows:
(5)(h) - In any decision made pursuant to this subdivision the court shall,
where appropriate, consider the effect of a barrier to remarriage, as defined
in subdivision six of section two hundred fifty-three of this article, on the
factors enumerated in paragraph d of this subdivision.
(6)(d) - In any decision made pursuant to this subdivision the court shall,
where appropriate, consider the effect of a barrier to remarriage, as defined
in subdivision six of section two hundred fifty-three of this article, on the
factors enumerated in paragraph a of this subdivision.
N.Y. DOM. REL. LAw §§ 236B(5)(h), 6(d).
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consider the effect of a barrier to remarriage" (as defined by the
1983 get statute) on the thirteen factors that must be considered in dividing marital assets, and on the eleven factors that
must be considered in setting maintenance in a divorce action.149 The policy underlying the 1992 amendment is that, in
order for courts equitably to divide marital assets and set maintenance, they must be able to consider the financial implications
of one party's inability to remarry. In the case of an agunah,
whose prospects of financial security may be seriously impaired
by her inability to remarry, the 1992 law allows judges to award
the woman a greater percentage of the marital assets to compensate for this disability.
If the intent of the 1992 get law is clear, the political forces
that gave rise to its passage are less so. Initially proposed in
1984,150 the legislation lay dormant for years. Once reintroduced in January 1992, the bill was passed and signed in a matter of months. Many commentators attribute this reactivation
and swift passage of the get bill to Justice Rigler's decision in
Schwartz v. Schwartz.151
Schwartz was a widely broadcast case with strong political
undertones. The father of plaintiff, Naomi Schwartz, is Rabbi
Sholom lass, publisher of The Jewish Press and an influential
figure in the Orthodox community; the defendant, Naomi's exhusband, was the newspaper's former managing editor. 152 De-

149. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW §§ 236B(5)(d)(1)-(13), (6)(a)(1)-(11) (McKinney
1986). In New York divorce actions, if the spouses fail to reach a settlement regarding the financial aspects of the divorce, the court will impose its own terms. In
doing so, courts are instructed by New York's Equitable Distribution Law to consider thirteen separate factors in dividing marital assets and eleven factors in setting maintenance. These factors include duration of the marriage, age and health
of both parties, the income and property of each party at time of marriage and
divorce, and present and future earning capacity of each party. Id. Significantly,
the thirteenth factor (and the eleventh factor in the case of maintenance) requires
the judge to consider "any other factor which the court shall expressly find to be
just and proper." Id. § 236B(5)(d)(13).
150. See Zwiebel, supra note 71, at 5 (stating that proposed legislation resembling the 1992 get bill was introduced as early as 1984).
151. 153 Misc. 2d 789, 583 N.Y.S.2d 716 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1992). Notably, Schwartz is a case in which the 1983 get statute did not apply because the
recalcitrant husband was the defendant.
152. Id.
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cided just five months prior to the get bill's passage, 153 Justice
Rigler held in Schwartz that the withholding of a get could be
taken into account by the court in determining the equitable
distribution of marital assets. Justice Rigler found statutory
authorization for this decision in factor thirteen of the equitable
distribution law, the "catchall" provision requiring the court to
consider "any other factor which the court shall expressly find
154
to be just and proper."
Subsequent to this ruling, Rabbi Kmass strongly lobbied for
the 1992 get bill, in part because its swift passage would positively impact the final judgment in his daughter's case. 155 Furthermore, according to Anthony Daniele, the plaintiff's attorney
in Schwartz, following Justice Rigler's decision, "proponents of
such a bill were able to convince other legislators and say:
'Here's a Supreme Court Judge who has agreed with this and
who believes that the law does empower him to do this.' "156
Many commentators, including the law's chief sponsor, believe that the 1992 get law merely codifies the Schwartz holding. 157 If so, then Schwartz bears ongoing significance because
it suggests that New York courts can consider the effect of one
party's withholding of a get in the context of equitable distribution even without the 1992 get amendments. For opponents of
the new law, Schwartz therefore signifies that repeal or amend153. Schwartz was decided on March 11, 1992. The 1992 get legislation was
signed, and became immediately effective, on August 12, 1992.
154. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAw § 236(B)(5)(d)(13).
155. In July 1992, when the 1992 get bill proceeded to Governor Cuomo's
desk, there had not yet been a final resolution of economic issues in the Schwartz
case. Rabbi Mass' Memorandum to the Governor in support of the bill declared: "I
am of course, aware that the enactment of the legislation will no doubt have a
positive effect on my daughter's case and that its rejection will have an adverse
impact. But I also sincerely wish that others in my family's unfortunate position
will be assured of being able to share in the ray of hope provided to us by Justice
Rigler's ruling." Memorandum from Rabbi Sholom Mass, to Governor Cuomo, regarding A. 2098 and S. 7863, July 16, 1992, in Legislative Bill Jacket, [19921 N.Y.
Laws ch. 415.
156. Telephone Interview with Anthony Daniele, Matrimonial Attorney (Feb.
14, 1994).
157. Historic 'Get' Bill Signed, JEWISH PRESS, July 23, 1992 at 1 (reporting
statement by Assemblyman Sheldon Silver that "the get bill would codify a recent
decision by Brooklyn Supreme Court Justice William Rigler ....
Silver said that
the benefits of Justice Rigler's ruling would now be available to litigants
statewide.")
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ment of the 1992 get legislation might not be sufficient to prevent Schwartz-type holdings in the future.
III.
A.

Evaluating the New York Get Legislation

Selecting Criteria

What do we mean when we call something a "good law"? Is
a good law simply a law with good intentions or is more required-for instance, that it have the good effects intended?
Moreover, if we measure a law by its "effects," upon what criteria should we base this measurement? These questions strike
deeply at the very meaning of government, but their answers
are also of practical and immediate importance to those who
make laws and have the power to change them, as well as to
those whose lives are regulated by laws that affect them. This
is particularly true in the case of the New York get legislation.
To date, New York remains the only state in the United States
that has legislatively addressed the agunah problem. Whether
the get legislation is "good law" bears important indications of
whether New York State, and other states, should continue
down this legislative course or retreat.
This section will evaluate the success of the New York get
legislation from the viewpoint that determining whether or not
a law is "good" must include an evaluation of whether the law
has achieved its stated and underlying intentions; whether its
anticipated positive effects have in fact materialized, and
whether it has had any unforeseen negative consequences. The
discussion that follows will separately analyze the 1983 and
1992 get laws on the basis of four criteria that incorporate this
viewpoint. They are: (1) Impact Within Civil Law-As frequently evidenced in United States history, how long a law
stays in force may not be the best indication of whether it is
constitutional. Passed amid a flurry of constitutional opposition, the 1983 get statute has now operated for over a decade,
essentially undisturbed by judicial or legislative challenge. Is
its survival a sign of the law's constitutional strength or of the
legal system's inability or unwillingness to repeal or overturn
it? (2) Impact Within Jewish Law-Have the 1983 and 1992 get
laws met with halachic approval and, moreover, is a lack of halachic consensus fatal to any get law's successful operation? (3)
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Quantifiable Effects-Do the 1983 and 1992 get laws actually
help agunot and prevent get extortion? (4) Unquantifiable Ef-

fects-What have been the get laws' positive and negative immeasurable effects? How have the laws impacted divorcing
non-Jews, the matrimonial bar, rabbinical courts, and grass
roots organizations that help agunot?
B. Evaluation of the 1983 Get Statute
1. Impact of the 1983 Get Statute Within Civil Law
From its inception, critics have attacked the 1983 get statute on a number of constitutional grounds, asserting that it violates the Establishment 158 and Free Exercise Clauses 159 of the
First Amendment, 60 and the Due Process 61 and Equal Protection Clauses 162 of the Fourteenth Amendment. 6 3 Nearly all

published evaluations of the 1983 get statute deem the law un158. The Establishment Clause, as incorporated by the Fourteenth Amendment, requires states to steer clear of religious affairs. For a law to be consistent
with the Establishment Clause, the traditional three-part test requires that it: (1)
have a secular purpose; (2) have a primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion; and (3) avoid excessive government entanglement with religion.
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-613 (1971) (first setting forth this threepart test). The Lemon test is a useful, not fixed, rule, see Lynch v. Donnelly, 465
U.S. 668 (1984) and Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 394 (1983) and recent cases
indicate that the Supreme Court may now disfavor the Lemon test. See Board of
Educ. of Kiryas Joel Village Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 114 S. Ct. 2481, 2484 (1994). But
see Nadel, supra note 11, at 80 (the Supreme Court has nonetheless applied the
Lemon test in nearly every Establishment Clause case decided since 1970).
159. The Free Exercise Clause requires states to affirmatively accommodate
religious beliefs to ensure that particular groups are not unduly burdened in the
practice of their religion. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AmmcAN CONsTrrTIoNAL LAw
§ 14-4, at 1166-69 (2d ed. 1988).
160. The First Amendment of the Constitution provides that "Congress shall
make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof..." U.S. CONST. amend. I. Together, the religion clauses regulate the
boundary-line between church and state, and both constitutional mandates must
be carefully balanced to determine when state accommodation of religion is prohibited, when it is permissible, and when it is arguably compelled in order to remove
state-imposed burdens on the free exercise of religion. See generally TRIBE, supra
note 159, at 1168.
161. The Due Process Clause guarantees an individual rights to certain procedural safeguards in the administration of justice, including, most importantly, the
right to be heard. Id.
162. The Equal Protection Clause, U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, essentially
entitles persons under like circumstances to equal protection in the enjoyment of
personal rights and the prevention and redress of wrongs. See TRIBE, supra note
159, at 1437.
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constitutional.164 Furthermore, in Chambers v. Chambers, 65
the only New York court to ever expressly consider the get statute's constitutionality cast serious doubt on the law's validity
and deemed it unconstitutional as applied to the facts of that
case.
Critics' constitutional analyses of the get statute vary considerably. Some defend the statute's validity under the Establishment Clause but not the Free Exercise Clause. For some,
the conclusion is reversed-The Establishment Clause is the
166 Still
problem and the Free Exercise Clause is not offended.

others feel the 1983 get statute's most serious violation is of due
process rights. As such, the body of constitutional literature
criticizing the 1983 get statute at once presents the law's
strongest defenses and greatest weaknesses. While it is not
within the scope of this article to explore the subtle contours of
these different arguments, it is significant that nearly all of the
constitutional analyses of New York's get legislation turn on the
answers to the following three questions: Is the agunah problem
a religious or secular problem? Is the execution of a get a religious or a non-religious act? And lastly, is it possible, as a practical matter, to draft any get legislation that satisfies all
constitutional mandates at once? Consideration of each of these
questions highlights why it would be difficult, if not impossible,
for any get law to remain free of constitutional doubt.
a. Is the Agunah Problem a Religious or Secular
Problem?
Underlying many First Amendment attacks on the 1983 get
statute's constitutionality is the perception that the agunah
163. The Fourteenth Amendment provides that "[nio State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the
United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
164. Not one law review article analyzing the 1983 get statute concludes that
it is free of constitutional difficulty. See supra note 22.
165. Chambers v. Chambers, 122 Misc. 2d 671, 471 N.Y.S.2d 958 (Sup. Ct.
N.Y. County 1983). See infra notes 193-203 and accompanying text.
166. See Rostain, supra note 6, at 1149 ("Divergent analyses of the get statute's constitutionality under the establishment clause are not surprising, given the
absence of a generally accepted approach that unifies free exercise and establishment jurisprudence.").
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problem arises from a woman's religious convictions and her desire to live within a religious community that burdens her right
to remarry. The problem, by this account, is internal to the
Jewish community and essentially religious in nature, such
that any get legislation will raise serious First Amendment
problems. 167 Thus, critics assert that the 1983 get statute violates the Establishment Clause because it lacks a legitimate
secular purpose; that it impermissibly incorporates religious
law into secular law by premising legal status on religious status;1

and it impermissibly advances Judaism over other reli-

gions by facilitating the remarriage of Jews while implicitly
excluding members of other religious groups from the statute's
coverage. 169
These constitutional infirmities do not necessarily arise,
however, if one views the burden on agunot as a problem exacerbated by the state's policies toward marriage and divorce. By
this alternative account, the state has amplified the agunah
problem already existing under Jewish law by allowing couples
170
to combine religious and secular marriages into one event,
without likewise requiring spouses to dissolve their religious
union when they civilly divorce. 171 As one commentator
explains:
When the husband presents a petition for divorce without making
provision for a religious divorce, the court becomes a party to the
creation of a state of affairs that may result in interference with
the free exercise of religion or lead to a gross inequity to the wife.
A divorce decree is designed to enable both parties to remarry. A
woman who for reasons of religious conscience is not free to remarry is deprived, by virtue of a judicial decree, of the potential
for consortium, the ability to establish a home and raise a family,
and often of ongoing support and maintenance. The court, in issuing a decree of divorce, establishes this inequity and, in effect,
167. Indeed, from the state's perspective, both spouses are perfectly free to
remarry upon the entrance of secular divorce judgment.
168. Kahan, supra note 3, at 206 ("To hold a person's divorce hostage to a
religious requirement cannot be a proper secular concern of the state"); Nadel,
supra note 11, at 83 ("[T]he get statute incorporates a religious requirement into
secular law. This matter cannot be a proper secular concern of the state.").
169. Nadel, supra note 11, at 86.
170. See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
171. See supra note 85 and accompanying text. See also Breitowitz, supra
note 2, at 393; Rostain, supra note 6, at 1165-66.
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tells the divorced wife that she may herself remedy the inequity
172
only by abandoning religious scruples.
From this perspective, the 1983 get statute does not advance
religion, but merely seeks to rectify that dimension of the
agunah problem that is actually caused by the state. 173 Thus,
under the Free Exercise Clause, the 1983 get statute is arguably compelled to eliminate a state-imposed burden on a Jewish
woman's religious observance, and under the Establishment
Clause, the statute advances the legitimate secular interests of
encouraging remarriage and protecting the fundamental right
174
to (re)marry.
The difficulty with this account, however, is that even if the
agunah problem is proper for secular concern, address of the
problem must either directly or indirectly implicate religious
practices. Consequently, it is difficult to escape the conclusion
that, at some level, all get legislation will fail strict First
Amendment scrutiny.
b.

Is the Execution of a Get a Religious or a NonReligious Act?

Critics assert that by conditioning the granting of a secular
divorce upon the husband's delivery of a get, the 1983 get statute's violations are twofold: it interferes with the husband's constitutional right not to participate in religious acts;175 and it
impermissibly advances religion by promoting the execution of
a get.176
Both of these arguments are premised on the characterization of a get's delivery as a religious act. While this might seem
like a foregone conclusion, in fact, the issue has generated considerable debate. Several commentators 177 and courts1 78 have
contended that there is nothing at all religious about a get, such
172. Bleich, supra note 3, at 280. See also Rostain, supra note 6, at 1166.
173. Feldman, supra note 22, at 157 (arguing that the get statute places Jews
on equal footing with other religious groups with respect to remarriage).
174. Some commentators have defended the 1983 get statute's legitimate secular purpose on the additional grounds that it protects the enforceability of secular
court judgments, and prevents the extortion of its citizens. Feldman, supra note
22, at 155-57.
175. Warmflash, supra note 22, at 241-49.
176. Kahan, supra note 3, at 206.
177. Bleich, supra note 3, at 202, 256-58; Rostain, supra note 6, at 1168-69.
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that requiring its execution neither advances nor compels religious participation.
Many features of the get process support this view. The delivery of a get involves neither worship nor profession of faith.179
No blessings are uttered by either spouse during its delivery,
nor does the text of the get itself invoke the name of God. 180 In
fact, a get may even be (and must be to enable the wife to remarry) executed by a husband who has formally renounced Judaism.' 8 ' While the delivery of the get is customarily
supervised by rabbinic authorities to ensure that it is executed
in accordance with Jewish law, conceptually it is an act of the
parties themselves, not of a rabbinical court. 8 2 Moreover, the
spouses themselves are not even required to participate in the
actual procedure; duly appointed representatives can give or receive the get on their behalf. 83 On the basis of these considera178. Stern v. Stern, 5. Fam. L. Rep. (BNA) 2810 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1979)
(holding that execution of a get is not a religious act); Minkin v. Minkin, 434 A.2d
665, 667-68 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1981) (relying upon expert testimony of four
rabbis in concluding that delivery of a get is not a religious act).
179. Bleich, supra note 3, at 257.
180. A literal translation of the text of the traditional get reads as follows:
On the ... day of the week, the ... day of the month of... in the year...
from the creation of the world according to the reckoning we count here, the
city of... which is situated on the river. .. (and on the river... ) (and
situated near springs [or: wells] of water), I .... (also known as... ), the son
of ... (also known as.. .), who stands this day in the city of. . . (also known
as . .. ), which is situated on the river... (and on the river... ) (and
situated near springs [or: wells] of water), have desired of my own will without being subject to duress and have abandoned and sent forth and dismissed thee to thyself, you, my wife,... (also known as... ), daughter of...
(also known as ... ), who stands this day in the city of.. . (also known as...
), which is situated on the river... (and on the river ... ) (and situated near
springs [or: wells] of water), who has been my wife from before. And now I
have sent forth and abandoned and dismissed thee to thyself that thou be
permitted and have authority over thyself to go and marry any man thou
may desire, and no person shall protest against thee from this day and for
ever more, and thou art permitted to every man (lit: and thou art unfettered
with regard to every man). This shall be unto thee from me a bill of dismissal, and a letter of abandonment, and an instrument of divorce in accordance with the law of Moses and Israel.
... the son of... , witness.
•.. the son of .... witness.
Translated by Rabbi J. David Bleich, supra note 3, at 257 n.177.
181. Id. at 257.
182. Id.
183. Id.
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tions, some commentators conclude that the get is no more than
that requiring its
the rescission of a marital contract, 184 such
18 5
execution poses no free exercise problems.
This view of the get is ultimately unpersuasive, however.
Even absent the trappings of a religious ceremony, the delivery
of a get constitutes a religious act for the sheer fact that it lacks
any rational justification other than the significance attached to
it by the Jewish religion.'86 Consequently, any civil legislation
that even indirectly pressures a man to give a get will most
likely run afoul of the Free Exercise Clause.
c. Is it Possible to Draft Get Legislation that
Satisfies All ConstitutionalMandates at
Once?
This final question asks: Even assuming that the agunah
problem is a valid secular concern, and that the execution of a
get is not a religious practice, is it possible to draft get legislation that, in actual operation, does not run afoul of some constitutional provision, either by entangling courts in religious
affairs or violating due process rights? The technical provisions
of the 1983 get statute indicate that constitutional violation of
some kind may be unavoidable.
Consider, for instance the 1983 get statute's "clergy veto"
provision, which permits the clergyman who performed the
wedding ceremony to block a civil divorce decree by filing an
affidavit stating that barriers to remarriage still exist.18 7 As
184. Bleich, supra note 3, at 256. See also Minkin, 434 A.2d at 668 (declaring
that "[tihe [glet procedure is a release document devoid of religious connotation"
such that the court may, "without infringing on his Constitutional rights, order the
defendant to specifically perform his contract" to execute a get).
185. Alternatively, others have argued that even if the get is a religious act,
the Free Exercise Clause is still not violated in the vast majority of cases in which
the husband's refusal to give a get is motivated by avarice or spite, not religious
belief. Nadel, supra note 11, at 95-96; Breitowitz, supra note 2, at 395-96.
Breitowitz asserts that husbands who contest the 1983 get statute as a violation of
their free exercise rights should be required to show that giving a get is offensive to
their sincerely held religious principles. He concludes that such a showing would
be difficult to make. Id. at 396.
186. Nadel, supra note 11, at 87-88; Marshall, supra note 22, at 218-19. One
critic further maintains that to treat the severing of a Jewish marriage on par with
the dissolution of a commercial transaction "distorts the special regard with which
Jewish tradition treats marriage." Kahan, supra note 3, at 207.
187. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAw § 253(7).
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written, this provision gives the rabbi the last word on whether
or not barriers to remarriage have been removed, and thereby
seems to quash a defendant's right to be heard under the Fourteenth Amendment. Absent such a provision, however, courts
would themselves be forced to investigate the truth or falsity of
affidavits stating that religious barriers had been removed, thus
entangling courts in the doctrinal questions of whether a plaintiff had complied with Jewish law. As one commentator concludes, "[t]he drafters of the law had to risk offending either the
Establishment Clause or the Due Process Clause; they chose
the latter." 88
A second example of the difficulties of drafting any constitutional get law is the provision of the 1983 get statute requiring the defendant to reimburse the plaintiff for cost incurred in
removing a barrier to remarriage (i.e. by executing a get); otherwise no "barrier to remarriage" is deemed to exist. 189 As one
commentator asserts, the result is that "an indigent woman
who cannot pay the fees necessary for a Jewish divorce theoretically might be unable to stop the civil courts from granting her
spouse a judgment. She would be deprived of a get because of
her inability and her husband's unwillingness to pay for one."19
But again, the alternative would be for courts to order plaintiffs
to pay for a religious procedure of no secular import-an even
greater constitutional concern.
Yet another constitutional tension in the drafting of the
1983 get statute is that, despite its facially neutral language,
the 1983 get statute cannot disguise its exclusive focus on Judaism.' 91 Under the Equal Protection Clause, therefore, the statute raises concerns under the Equal Protection Clause both
because it places an additional burden only upon Jewish per192
sons and because it seeks to help only Jewish individuals.
The statute's difficulties under the Due Process Clause
arose in the Chambers case, 193 the only case to date that has
evaluated the constitutionality of the 1983 get statute. In
188. Feldman, supra note 22, at 159.
189. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAw § 253(6).
190. Kahan, supra note 3, at 205.
191. See supra notes 135-37 and accompanying text. Cf Board of Educ. of
Kiryas Joel Village Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 114 S. Ct. 2481 (1994).
192. Kahan, supra note 3, at 205.
193. 122 Misc. 2d 671, 471 N.Y.S.2d 958 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1983).

41

744

PACE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 15:703

Chambers, in which neither party was Jewish, the wife filed for
divorce shortly after the get statute's enactment. The parties
had lived apart for one year pursuant to a separation agreement and, because the divorce action was uncontested, 194 the
court would normally have entered a divorce judgment as a
matter of course. However, under the new statute's provisions,
both spouses were now additionally required to file affidavits
stating that they had removed all barriers to remarriage before
a final divorce decree could be entered. 195 The husband refused
196
to do So.
The Chambers court declared that, applied to the facts of
this case, the 1983 get statute had the perverse effect of
preventing a woman from receiving a divorce because her husband refused to grant an item of relief that she had never requested, and as such, could amount to a violation of due process
under the Fourteenth Amendment. 197 Furthermore, given that
neither party in Chambers was Jewish, the court questioned
whether a law that placed procedural requirements on all
faiths, while applying substantively to members of only one
faith, violated due process requirements as well. 198
In spite of raising these broad reaching due process arguments, the Chambers court ultimately decided the case on the
narrower ground of the Contracts Clause of the Constitution. 199
194. Id. at 672, 471 N.Y.S.2d at 960.
195. Significantly, at the time of the Chambers case, the 1983 get statute had
not been amended to include a waiver provision. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAw § 253(2)(ii)
(McKinney 1986 & Supp. 1995).
196. Chambers, 122 Misc. 2d at 671, 471 N.Y.S.2d at 959.
197. Id. at 673, 471 N.Y.S.2d at 960.
It might further be argued at least for the reason that there is no way to
extract a removal of barriers statement from a defendant, that the requirement is as much a denial of due process as would be a law preventing the
entry of a judgment (in any type of action) where a defendant refuses to
appear or answer.
Id at 673, 471 N.Y.S.2d at 960.
198. Id. at 672, 471 N.Y.S.2d at 960.
199. Id. at 674, 471 N.Y.S.2d at 961. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
No State shall enter into any Treaty, Alliance, or Confederation; grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal; Coin Money; emit Bills of Credit; make any
Thing but gold and silver Coin a Tender in Payment of Debts; pass any Bill
of Attainder, ex post facto Law, or Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts, or grant any Title of Nobility.
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The court declared that at the time the parties entered into the
separation agreement, each party had a right to the judicial
remedy of divorce upon substantial compliance with the agreement for one year. Therefore, to allow the 1983 get statute to
prevent a divorce judgment would interfere with the constitutionally protected obligations of contracts. 200 The court entered
a judgment of divorce and voided the 1983 get statute as applied
to spouses who had entered into similar contractual agreements
201
prior to the statute's passage.
The issue presented in Chambers never arose again and
has become moot with the passage of time. 20 2 Furthermore,
since Chambers,no New York court decision has challenged the
1983 get statute's constitutionality and at least one court has
expressly declined to do so. 203 In short, the get statute's sur-

vival has been quite remarkable: it has enjoyed twelve years of
nearly uninterrupted operation, despite a consensus (at least
among academics) that it is unconstitutional. The host of constitutional attacks leveled against the 1983 get statute, while
compelling, remain confined to law review articles, classroom
discussions, and the dicta of one court's holding that is now considered obsolete. But why?
The simplest and most frequently offered explanation is
that the 1983 get statute was passed for admirable reasons and
does not seem to offend or threaten anyone-except perhaps, for
the recalcitrant spouse. 20 4 As one commentator declared in criticizing a Reform organization for its vocal opposition to the 1983
get bill:
200. Chambers, 122 Misc. 2d at 675, 471 N.Y.S.2d at 961.
201. Id. at 675, 471 N.Y.S.2d at 961.
202. Nadel, supra note 11, at 73 (contracts clause challenges to theget statute
now moot).
203. In the recent case of Kaplinsky v. Kaplinsky, 198 A.D.2d 212, 603
N.Y.S.2d 574 (2d Dep't 1993), the court declined to consider constitutional arguments against the 1983 get statute, even though the American Jewish Congress
had filed a brief on the constitutional issues as amicus curiae. Id. at 213, 603
N.Y.S.2d at 575.
204. See Nadel, supra note 11, at 99 (although technically unconstitutional,
the get statute has escaped invalidation because of its good intentions). Cf Mark
Berman, Comment, Kosher Fraud Statutes and the Establishment Clause: Are
They Kosher?, 26 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PRoBs. 1, 66 (1992) (employing this same
rationale to explain the survival of kosher fraud statutes, which he deems
unconstitutional).
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[Is it necessary to oppose [the get bill] in such trenchant and vigorous manner? Is it not conceivable that in some issues we can be
passive, letting matters slide by without intervention, or even
comment? This posture may be perceived as quite appropriate,
for no individual will suffer personal loss by allowing this law to
take effect, while, clearly, so many others have everything-their
very lives-to gain. Under these circumstances it is rather hollow
and empty to assail a law in order to pursue a principle for its own
20 5
sake.
This same rationale helps to explain why judges have been so
reluctant to consider the law's constitutionality. "It's one of
these questions that everyone would like to see avoided," said
Alan Dershowitz. 2°6 Likewise, Richard Kurtz asserted,
"[niobody wants to be the bad guy and knock it out constitutionally, so every Supreme Court judge, wheh faced with that issue,
is simply going to uphold the statute."2 7 Kurtz maintained that
appellate courts are just as likely as trial courts to avoid the
issue, effectively leaving it to the New York Court of Appeals to
20 8
decide.
But even assuming that the Court of Appeals would review
a challenge to the 1983 get statute, opponents of the law must
first find a plaintiff who is willing to act as a constitutional test
case. 2°9 This obstacle is not insignificant. Few plaintiffs in the
last decade have independently sought to challenge the law's
constitutionality, and organizational efforts to recruit such individuals have failed. 210 Consequently, although nearly all com205. Julian M. White, Do Not Oppose the Get Bill, SH'MA, J. JEWIsH RESPONSIBILITY, Nov. 25, 1983, at 10.

206. Telephone Interview with Alan Dershowitz, Professor of Law, Harvard
Law School (Feb. 16, 1994). "It's obviously a very well-intentioned statute," Dershowitz explained, "and nobody likes these guys who hold out and won't give the
get." Id.
207. Telephone Interview with Richard Kurtz, Matrimonial Attorney (Mar. 7,
1994).
208. Id.
209. Under the rules of standing, only those who are directly affected by the
1983 get statute's provisions have the right to challenge its constitutionality in
court. Thus, organizations like the ACLU cannot institute a constitutional challenge on its own, but must rely on the "test cases" of actual plaintiffs. TRIBE, supra
note 159, § 3-14, at 107-08.
210. Rabbi Bernard Zlotowitz recalled that after the enactment of the 1983
get statute the Union of American Hebrew Congregations and the New York Federation of Reform Synagogues (both representing Reform Jews) proclaimed their
readiness to assist and finance any legal challenge of the law. He said that the one
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mentators interviewed for this article predicted that the
statute's constitutionality would eventually be ruled on by the
Court of Appeals, no one reported any current challenges to the
law or knew of any organizational plans to foster such a challenge in the near future.

For Nathan Lewin, the fact that plaintiffs would rather
comply with the 1983 get law than challenge it is a sign of the
law's success.
I think what has happened in these cases is that, by and large, as
stubborn as people may be, or as much as they may want to use
[the get] for leverage, they're not ready to go the all-out constitutional battle. And that means that as a practical matter this re211
solves cases.
From an alternate viewpoint, however, the 1983 get statute's
longevity is not a sign of its success, but of Governor Cuomo's
disingenuousness in stating, upon signing the get law, that "[i]f
there is a constitutional impediment, I am sure our excellent
courts will make that clear in due time."212 According to Ralph
Michael Stein, by leaving to the courts a bill surrounded by constitutional doubt, Governor Cuomo violated his inherent obligation as a chief magistrate to make an independent assessment
about the bill's constitutionality before signing it into law.
From Stein's perspective, the 1983 get statute's longevity therefore stands out as a glaring example of the government's failure
to scrutinize and weed out unconstitutional legislation.
Both Lewin's and Stein's analyses are flawed. In suggesting that the unwillingness of plaintiffs to challenge the
1983 get statute should be interpreted as a sign of the law's
merit, Lewin overlooks the disincentives that might discourage
or prevent an individual from challenging the law despite a beperson who agreed to act as a test case backed out once realizing that a law suit
could take several years. Telephone Interview with Bernard Zlotowitz, Reform
Rabbi (Feb. 24, 1994).
211. Telephone Interview with Nathan Lewin, Attorney, Miller, Cassidy, Larroca & Lewin, Washington, D.C. (Apr. 7, 1994).
212. Governor's Memorandum on Approval of ch. 979, N.Y. Laws (Aug. 8,
1983), reprinted in [1983] N.Y. Laws 2818, 2819 (McKinney). "I think his tongue
must have been pretty deep into his cheek when he made that statement," said
Ralph Michael Stein of the Governor's statement. Stein asserts that, as a former
law professor, Governor Cuomo probably knew how unrealistic that statement was
when uttered. Telephone Interview with Ralph M. Stein, Professor of Law, Pace
University School of Law (Mar. 2, 1994).
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lief that it offends the Constitution. Litigation requires time
and money. Especially in the area of divorce, individuals might
forego the vindication of their constitutional rights in order to
get on with their lives. 213 Taken to its logical extreme, Lewin's
analysis could have the perverse effect of hailing as a success
unconstitutional legislation that survives because it is too big a
burden to challenge.
Stein's analysis is flawed as well. Assuming that Governor
Cuomo had a good faith doubt as to whether the get bill was
constitutional, and that he had no way of decisively resolving
the question in advance, 214 he justifiably signed the bill on the
basis of other considerations. To require our legislators and executive officials to predict how courts will rule on the novel constitutional questions raised by proposed legislation would make
every legislator a judge who could quash, from their inception,
many innovative proposals that might later have been constitutionally upheld.
The longevity of the 1983 get statute should instead be interpreted in two ways: First, it should be regarded as a remarkable example of how a law's chances for enactment and
constitutional survival are greatly bolstered when the law has
moral and political force standing squarely behind it. Second,
and more importantly, the 1983 get statute's longevity should
be perceived as an indication that the law's constitutional
problems are less severe in practice than they are in theory. In
twelve years, no court has declined to apply the statute for reasons of entanglement; no case has challenged the unfairness of
21 5
the "clergy veto" or the monetary reimbursement provisions;
and few plaintiffs have claimed that the 1983 get statute inter213. See supra note 210.
214. New York State courts, like most state and federal courts (including the
United States Supreme Court) do not issue advisory opinions on proposed
legislation.
215. One commentator asserts:
The drafters of section 253 seem to have taken the chance that it would be
rare for a spouse denied a divorce by the clergy veto to contest a rabbi's
affidavit. The gamble seems to have paid off. The law has not yet been challenged on these grounds, perhaps because no plaintiff with a sincere due
process claim has come forward. Most recalcitrant husbands, it appears,
could not honestly claim that all the requirements of religious divorce have
been met.
Feldman, supra note 22, at 160.
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feres with their free exercise rights. These facts do not eliminate the law's constitutional difficulties or the possibility that a
court will declare the statute unconstitutional; but to the extent
that the 1983 get statute is judged on the basis of its practical
effects rather than its facial implications, these facts do indicate
that the law may be more constitutionally sound than critics
assert.
2. Impact of the 1983 Get Statute Within Jewish Law
In contrast to the complications it raises within civil law,
from the vantage point of Jewish law, the 1983 get statute is an
unquestioned success. Rabbinic authorities agree that the get
statute does not coerce a man to give a get and therefore poses
no problems under Jewish law.2 16 Their rationale, explained

Rabbi Kenneth Auman, is as follows:
If a person comes to the bet din and says, "I'm only giving this get
because the court is telling me to," the rabbis will say, "Now just a
minute. The court isn't telling you to give a get. The court is only
telling you that if you want the civil divorce, you have to give a
get. But that's your decision." 217
The 1983 get statute owes much of its halachic success to
extensive efforts by Agudath Israel and the law's drafters to obtain the approval of rabbinic leaders before presenting any proposal to the legislature. "It was [our] working hypothesis," said
Aaron Twerski, "that we would back no legislation that did not
have wall-to-wall approval. In other words, it would do us no
good to create a situation in which somebody would be [religiously] divorced in the eyes of some and not in the eyes of
others. 218
3.

QuantifiableEffects of the 1983 get Statute

Despite the get statute's popular appeal and halachic success, the truth of the matter is that, in its twelve years of opera216. See supra text accompanying note 34 explaining that for a get to be
halachicallyvalid it must be given of the man's free will. Nadel, supra note 11, at
97 (unlike the 1992 amendments, the get statute poses no halachic problems).
217. Telephone Interview with Kenneth Auman, Orthodox Rabbi (Mar. 2,
1994).
218. Telephone Interview with Aaron Twerski, Professor of Law, Brooklyn
Law School, Officer, Agudath Israel (Mar. 21, 1994).
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tion, the law has helped few agunot. Even optimistic accounts
admit that the law has been useful in only "a handful of
cases," 2 19 and caseworkers at G.E.T. and Get Free report that
the 1983 get statute rarely makes any difference in their
work. 220 The chief problem is that the law only helps if the recalcitrant spouse is the one who sues for divorce, but in the vast
majority of divorce actions in which the get becomes an issue,
22 1
women are the plaintiffs.
Despite this disappointing picture, casting the 1983 get
statute to the pile of ineffective legislation may be too hasty.
First of all, those who drafted the law knew its limitations from
the outset. From their perspective, rather than a disappointment, the 1983 get statute has achieved its purported, if limited
goals. "It was not a panacea and it was not intended to be a
panacea," asserted Aaron Twerski, explaining the statute was
designed to help agunot only in the narrow range of cases to
which the law applies. 222 And in some cases, however few, commentators agree that the law has been the decisive factor in a
recalcitrant husband's decision to give a get. "Even if it causes
the giving of a get in a handful of situations in which otherwise
219. Dovid Zwiebel ("helps for a narrow range of cases"); J. David Bleich
("marginal success"); Deborah Eifferman (effective in "some" cases); Marvin Jacob
("didn't work too well"); Ruth Englart ("not that helpful"); Mordechai Willig ("had
no teeth"); Bernard Zlotowitz ("didn't help women"); Yehuda Levin ("hasn't made
much difference"); Rivka Haut ("did nothing really"); Marvin Schick ("not much
impact"); Richard Kurtz (worked in "a few" instances); Jeffrey Sunshine ("flawed").
See Appendix A.
220. The get law is useful, said David Long, only if the agunah seeking help
has not yet filed for a secular divorce. In that case, G.E.T. advises the woman to
wait for her husband to file the action, so that the get statute's provisions will
apply. Telephone Interview with David Long, Chairman, G.E.T. Organization
(Mar. 2, 1994).
221. See supra note 145 and accompanying text. Commentators estimate that
Orthodox women initiate the secular divorce action in anywhere from 80 to 99 percent of all cases for a host of social, financial and religious reasons. A woman who
is involved in an abusive relationship may pursue a secular divorce even it means
that she risks not obtaining a religious divorce. Telephone Interview with Rivka
Haut, Director, AGUNAH, Founder, ICAR (Mar. 6, 1994).
222. Telephone Interview with Aaron Twerski, Professor of Law, Brooklyn
Law School, Officer, Agudath Israel (Mar. 21, 1994). Menachem Lubinsky, who in
1983 served as Agudath Israel's vice president of Government and Public Affairs,
agreed. "Well, look, we knew it wouldn't be perfect," he said. "But we figured that
even if it helped in only a percentage of the cases, it was far better than we had at
that time." Telephone Interview with Menachem Lubinsky, Former Vice President, Agudath Israel (Feb. 21, 1994).
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the get might not have been given," said Nathan Lewin, "I believe it would have been worth putting into effect. And I think
it has, at the very least, achieved that."223
Those who quickly dismiss the 1983 get statute as ineffective may also be overlooking the law's immeasurable preemptive force. Because the statute erects formal requirements with
which all individuals married in a religious ceremony must
comply before they can even file a divorce complaint, it is nearly
impossible to determine the number of cases in which a Jewish
man who sued for divorce would have refused to deliver a get
absent the law. "You're dealing with what's going on inside the
cranium of a man," said Rabbi Bleich. "You'll never know in
most cases where a man does execute the divorce whether he
would have done it anyway, or whether he did it because his
attorney told him, 'You don't need the hassle.' "224 According to
personal accounts of rabbis and lawyers, the law's preemptive
force is not merely speculative; one rabbi reported that he has
concluded over 150 gittin since 1983 in which the get statute
has been helpful. 225 Similarly, attorney Jeffrey Sunshine said
he has represented several clients who agreed to cooperate in
religious divorces only after he explained the statute's impact
226
on their ability to file for civil divorce.
223. Telephone Interview with Nathan Lewin, Attorney, Miller, Cassidy, Larroca & Lewin, Washington, D.C. (Apr. 7, 1994).
224. Telephone Interview with J. David Bleich, Orthodox Rabbi, Professor of
Jewish Law and Ethics, Cardozo Law School of Yeshiva University (Mar. 2, 1994).
Nathan Lewin similarly declared:
There may be out there hundreds of situations where a party has said, "I'm
not going to be able to use [the get],' and looked to other factors that he
could legitimately use as a bargaining chip. If in fact this has happened in a
number of cases-and there's no way of knowing if this has happened in a
significant number of cases-then is seems to me the law is a success.
Telephone Interview with Nathan Lewin, Attorney, Miller, Cassidy, Larroca &
Lewin, Washington, D.C. (Apr. 7, 12994).
225. Zwiebel, supra note 71, at 4 (citing Interview with Rabbi Leib Landisman, Head of the bet din of the Kollel Horabbonim in Monsey, New York, in JEwISH HOMEMAKER, Oct. 1992).
226. Even in situations in which the get statute does not apply, Sunshine said
that he refuses to represent Jewish men who plan to use the get as a bargaining
tool or device for extortion. "When I represent men," Sunshine said, "I tell them if
they're going to use a get as a weapon to go somewhere else. I have the wherewithal and the ability to do that." Telephone Interview with Jeffrey Sunshine,
Matrimonial Attorney (Mar. 21, 1994). So does attorney Harvey Jacobs, who declared that "maybe what the legislation really reflects is what we as attorneys feel
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While these reports are encouraging, they do not erase the
fact that the direct impact of the 1983 get statute has still been
marginal. For most agunot, whose husbands can strategically
escape the get statute's provisions or are never subject to them
in the first place, the 1983 get statute is a weak law that has
done little or nothing to improve their situation.
4.

UnquantifiableEffects of the 1983 Get Statute

More important than the law's direct assistance to women
has been its symbolic and teaching force in sensitizing attorneys, lawmakers, and the general public to the problems confronted by agunot. "It was very important," said Alan
Dershowitz, "to be the first state to do something and to, in effect, symbolically announce that the law and the state care
about women who can't remarry, for whatever reason." 227 Since
its enactment, four other state legislatures have considered get
legislation modeled after the 1983 get statute. 22 In 1986, Ontario adopted get legislation based upon the New York example
229
which was later incorporated into federal Canadian law.
is the appropriate way of handling it.... I think it's the attitude of the attorneys
that really makes the law effective." Telephone Interview with Harvey Jacobs,
Matrimonial Attorney (Mar. 7, 1994). The ethical responsibilities of lawyers who
represent recalcitrant spouses is an interesting subject for consideration that goes
beyond the scope of this article. At the time he assisted in drafting the 1983 get
statute, Alan Dershowitz also proposed to the New York Bar Association a provision that would make it unethical for a lawyer to assist a client in using a religious
restriction as a bargaining device in negotiations relating to divorce. Dershowitz
said the matrimonial bar rejected his proposal. Telephone Interview with Alan
Dershowitz, Professor of Law, Harvard Law School (Feb. 16, 1994). Jeffrey Sunshine likewise rejected this proposal on principle: "Society is trying to place upon
matrimonial lawyers the burden of undoing society's ills." Telephone Interview
with Jeffrey Sunshine, Matrimonial Attorney (Mar. 21 1994).
227. Telephone Interview with Alan Dershowitz, Professor of Law, Harvard
Law School (Feb. 16, 1994).
228. Legislation modeled after the New York get statute has been proposed in
California, New Jersey, Connecticut, and Pennsylvania. Significantly, the legislation has failed to pass in all of these states, supporting accounts that attribute the
get statute's passage in New York to the strong political lobby of New York's large
Orthodox Jewish population.
229. The Canadian statutes were initially enacted in 1986 as an amendment
to the Ontario Family Act. Ontario Family Act §§ 2(4)-(6). By an act of June 12,
1990, the Ontario law was incorporated into the federal Canada Divorce Act. Canada Divorce Act, I S.C. ch. 18, § 21.1 (1990). The Canadian get statute goes much
further than the New York get statute in that it requires a husband to remove
barriers to remarriage whether he is a plaintiff or a defendant. Under the strin-
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Efforts by the New York Bar Association and grass roots
organizations to disseminate information about the 1983 get
statute have further helped to educate matrimonial lawyers
about the problems of agunot.230 Finally, local and national media coverage of the agunah problem generated by the statute's
enactment have educated the public, contributing to a legal and
social climate that increasingly encourages women to come forward with their troubles in obtaining gittin.231
Weighing its impact on civil law and Jewish law, as well as
its quantifiable and unquantifiable effects, the 1983 get statute
has been a moderate success. Although the law has certainly
not solved the agunah problem, it has produced several beneficial results with correspondingly few drawbacks. Its burden
upon divorcing spouses for whom the get is not an issue is de

gent Canadian provision, a husband's failure to deliver a get within 15 days of his
wife's demand (10 days under the Ontario Family Act) will trigger the automatic
striking of all the husband's claims and defenses in a divorce proceeding, including
those relating to child custody and support. While the Canadian law reportedly
has been very effective in assisting women, it also poses serious halachic problems
and would clearly violate the U.S. Constitution.
230. Several programs on the New York get legislation have been sponsored
by the family law section of the New York Bar Association. According to Jeffrey
Sunshine, most Brooklyn attorneys are informed of the get statute's existence and
implications, in part due to these programs. Telephone Interview with Jeffrey
Sunshine, Matrimonial Attorney (Mar. 21, 1994). Deborah Eifferman and David
Long report that one of the G.E.T. organization's focuses over the past decade has
been to inform matrimonial lawyers of the get law's existence and of the plight of
women who do not receive gittin. David Long said that representatives of G.E.T.
have conducted numerous sessions and provided information to the matrimonial
bar. "I would say that a very high percentage of lawyers in the matrimonial bar of
the state of New York are aware of the get law," Long said. "It's almost routine in a
separation agreement where the parties are Jewish that there is a clause put in
that the parties agree they will appear before an acceptable bet din for the purposes of going though the get process." Telephone Interview with David Long,
Chairman, G.E.T. Organization (Mar. 2, 1994).
231. Not everyone regards the higher profile of the agunah problem as a positive effect, however. Dovid Zwiebel declared:
When the plight of the aguna[h]stirs the creative imagination of television
programmers and pulp novelists; when individual cases become the subject
of feature articles in such mass media publications as New York Magazine
and The Village Voice; when prominent rabbonim [rabbis] and batei din, and
even Hashem's [God's] holy Torah itself, are publicly portrayed as insensitive and inhumane-the [result] is terrible.
Zwiebel, supra note 71, at 2.
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minimis. 232 Yet, in divorces in which the get is an issue, for
some women the 1983 statute has been the decisive reason they
received a get, which is significant even if their number is few.
Moreover, the statute has helped to raise awareness of the
agunah problem among judges, lawyers, and the general public-in New York and elsewhere-who may be able to assist
agunot in other ways, even if the law falls short. Finally, the
law has impressively avoided the serious halachic obstacles
that confront any attempt to legislate in this area; venturing
into the uncharted territory of civil legislation, the 1983 get
statute has won unanimous rabbinic approval.
The only serious and potentially fatal flaw of the 1983 get
statute is its suspected unconstitutionality, a concern which has
yet to be decisively addressed by the New York courts. In this
regard, however, the get statute's longevity indicates that the
law's constitutional flaws may be worse in theory than in practice, and that political and moral support for the legislation remains strong.
C.

Evaluating the 1992 Get Legislation

In many ways it is too early to evaluate the 1992 get law.
Attorneys and courts have only begun to implement it, and
analysis of its impact upon the Jewish community are still
based more on prediction than fact. Nonetheless, several factors urge early analysis. Unlike the 1983 get statute, the 1992
law has sparked a major halachic controversy within the Orthodox community, with some rabbinic authorities supporting the
measure and others asserting that any get delivered pursuant
to the law is invalid.2 m The dispute continues to flare and casts
doubt on the law's chances for survival. Thus, we stand at an
important juncture in the 1992 law's history, when community
leaders and policy makers are themselves deciding what the
232. In light of the law's formal requirements, it has become standard for parties to allege in complaints and settlement agreements that they will remove barriers to remarriage. Moreover, the get statute's affirmative requirements can easily
be waived if neither party cares about a religious divorce, or if the parties are not
Jewish.
233. See Editor'sNote, JEWISH PRESS, Jan. 21, 1994, at 37 ("The so-called New
York Get Law has generated more debate than any other legislative issue in recent
memory").
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law's future should be. Objective evaluation of the law at this
time is critical.
1. Impact of the 1992 Get Legislation Within Civil Law
There has been little academic analysis of the constitutional implications of 1992 get law. The one article on the subject concludes, however, that the 1992 get amendment to New
York's equitable distribution statute represents an even greater
violation of First Amendment principles than its 1983
4
predecessor.2
In particular, the 1992 law raises problems under the Free
Exercise Clause that do not arise with the 1983 get statute. If
one agrees with rabbinic authorities who assert that any get delivered pursuant to the 1992 get legislation is invalid under
Jewish law,235 the 1992 amendments have the perverse and unconstitutional effect ofpreventing individuals from performing a
religious act:
This free exercise claim is a unique one. While most free exercise
claims involve laws of general applicability that somehow interfere with religious practices, the [1992] amendments involve laws
passed for the express purpose of solving a religious problem but
that backfired and actually aggravated the problem. Such a result suggests an overlooked yet important justification for the
Religion Clauses of the First Amendment. Without the separation of church and state, the government may pass a law in order
to solve a religious dilemma; yet because of poor drafting or legislative unfamiliarity with the details of6 a given religion, the law
may backfire with disastrous results23
This free exercise analysis only applies, however, insofar as
one agrees that the 1992 get law violates halacha. There is no
rabbinic consensus on this point. Fundamental questions such
as "[ius the delivery of a get a religious act?" and "[w]hat types of
coercion will invalidate a get?" are as controversial from a halachic perspective as a constitutional one, in effect further nar234. Nadel, supra note 11, at 56. Nadel concludes that the 1992 get law violates both the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause, whereas the
1983 get statute violates only the former. Nadel likewise asserts that the holding
in the Schwartz case is unconstitutional. Id. at 99.
235. See infra notes 241-44 and accompanying text.
236. Nadel, supra note 11, at 98.

53

756

PACE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 15:703

rowing the ground upon which any get legislation may
constitutionally and halachically stand.
Given its generation of both constitutional and halachic
concerns, the longevity of the 1992 get amendments is not assured. Agudath Israel has already been seeking a legislative
amendment that would explicitly undo the 1992 law's legal effect. 237 Moreover, because the 1992 get law has actual financial
ramifications upon the division of marital assets and setting of
maintenance, individuals affected by the law may have strong
incentive to challenge it. Nonetheless, if the Schwartz case and
the longevity of the 1983 get law provide any indication, New
York judges who support the equitable purpose behind the 1992
get law may be unwilling to strike it down.
2.

Impact of the 1992 Get Law Within Religious Law

It is in the area of religious law that the 1992 get law has
raised the greatest problems. In the words of Dovid Zwiebel,
the 1992 get legislation "has torn apart the halachic community."238 Although numerous rabbinic and Jewish organizations
supported the 1992 get bill,239 after its enactment, Agudath
Israel came out in fierce opposition to the law, sparking a con24
troversy that has generated confusion and bitterness. 0
237. Agudath Israel seeks legislative amendment, rather than outright repeal, of the 1992 get law because it worries that repeal would leave the effect of the
Schwartz holding intact. See supra note 157 and accompanying text. "The ideal
solution, therefore," said Dovid Zwiebel, "would be to amend the statute so as to
preclude any possibility of judicial compulsion through equitable distribution."
Zwiebel, supra note 71, at 8 n.13.
238. Telephone Interview with Dovid Zwiebel, Legal Counsel to Agudath
Israel (Feb. 21, 1994).
239. Organizations urging the governor's endorsement of the bill included the
Union of Orthodox Jewish Congregations of America (representing approximately
1000 Orthodox congregations in the United States), The National Council of Young
Israel (comprising more than 300 synagogues in the United States and Israel), The
Jewish Press, and COLPA (a voluntary association of attorneys and social scientists organized to represent the Orthodox community in public matters). Only one
organization filed a memorandum in opposition, the Association of the Bar of the
City of New York. Agudath Israel filed no memorandum either in support of or in
opposition to the bill. See Memorandum from Margo Paz, Legislative Coordinator
of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York, to Elizabeth Moore, Counsel
to the Governor, regarding A. 2098, July 17, 1992, in Legislative Bill Jacket, [1992]
N.Y. Laws ch. 415.
240. Disagreement over the 1992 get law's halachicimplications stems in part
from the political process by which it was enacted. Opponents maintain that, in

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol15/iss3/2

54

19951

BEYOND THE CONSTITUTION

757

Opponents declare that by enabling a secular court to deprive a man of financial assets on the basis of his failure to give
a get, the 1992 get law nullifies the man's free will and renders
any get he delivers to avoid the law's financial ramifications
halachically invalid. 241 Consequently, opponents assert, the
1992 get law represents "a dangerous time-bomb to the validity
of many [glittin"that will harm women, not help them. 242 Moreover, they warn, the 1992 get law endangers the entire Jewish
community because women who obtain a get pursuant to the
law may later discover that part of the community considers
their get invalid and regards the children of a second marriage
as mamzerim.243 "These problems will become germane and accontrast to the sponsors of the 1983 get legislation, who sought universal halachic
consensus before introducing the bill to the legislature, the sponsors of the 1992
legislation made no such effort. Zwiebel, supra note 71, at 5; Rabbi Chaim Malinowitz, The New York State Get Bill and Its Halachic Ramifications,J. HALAcHA &
CONTEMP. Soc'y, Spring 1994, at 7 (1992 get bill passed without public hearings or
input from halachic authorities). However, the 1992 law's proponents counter that
comments on the 1992 get bill were widely solicited from rabbinic authorities and
organizations, including Agudath Israel, and that when no criticism of the bill was
offered, its drafters assumed there was no objection. Marvin Jacob, The Agunah
Problem-Clearing Up Some Misunderstandings About the So-Called New York
State Get Law, JEWISH PRESS, Jan. 21, 1994, at 41 n.10.
Either way, comparison of the 1992 get law with the 1983 get statute illustrates that, when legislating in sensitive areas, the process by which a law is
drafted and passed can be as important as its substance. Part of the controversy
generated by the 1992 law has emanated from the perception that comment from
religious authorities was not sufficiently solicited and considered. In contrast, the
legitimacy of the 1983 get statute has stemmed in part from rabbinic faith in the
thorough process employed by the statute's drafters in seeking halachicconsensus.
241. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
242. Malinowitz, supra note 240, at 8. Dovid Zwiebel states: " T]he law provides a wily recalcitrant husband with yet an additional weapon in his arsenal to
ensure that his wife will not receive a get. All he needs to do is tell the beft] din
that he wants to give his wife a get in order to avoid losing assets in equitable
distribution." Zwiebel, supra note 71, at 8. In this situation Zwiebel explains, no
rabbinical court will oversee the giving of an invalid get; nor will a secular court
reduce the husband's assets once presented with evidence of the bet din's conclusion that the husband is not halachically capable of giving a get. Id. at 7. By the
law's definition, a husband who attempts to give a get but is refused by the
rabbinical tribunal has taken all "voluntary" steps to remove barriers to remarriage and therefore has technically complied with the law's requirements. Id.
243. Malinowitz, supra note 240, at 8. See supra note 5 for an explanation of
mamzer status.
Malinowitz further admonishes that by encouraging agunot to bring their divorce matters to secular fora, the law contravenes the halachicmandate that Jews
resolve all civil and religious disputes in batei din. See supra note 31. "This prohi-
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tual twenty years from now when you're dealing with the rights
of children to marry legitimately," predicted Rabbi J. David
Bleich, one of the 1992 law's most vocal opponents, who has
taken the public position that any get issued since the passage
of the 1992 amendments is under a cloud of doubt and presumptively invalid. 2 "
Supporters of the 1992 get legislation reject this draconian
approach as both a misinterpretation of what the 1992 law says
and a "sad commentary" on rabbinic unwillingness to help agunot.2A 5 "It is the law, not the Halachah,that is in controversy,"
said Marvin Jacob, who asserts that, when correctly interpreted, the legal effect of the 1992 get amendments is far more
limited than opponents believe.2 4 6 By Jacob's account, rather
than a punitive or mandatory provision, the 1992 get amendment allows judges only "where appropriate"to consider the indirect effect of a woman's ability to remarry upon her actual
financial prospects, such that women with substantial incomes
or financial resources would not stand to benefit from the law's
provisions. 2 47 Nor, Jacob asserts, does the 1992 get law violate
halacha; because only "voluntary acts" can constitute "barriers
to remarriage,"2 " he asserts, if a man is judged by a bet din to
be acting involuntarily, no "barrier to remarriage" will be
deemed to exist and the 1992 law will not apply.24 9 Consebition is a most severe one no matter how lackadaisical an attitude people have
towards it," asserts Rabbi Chaim Malinowitz. "It hardly behooves the Orthodox
community, its institutions and its organizations, to take steps which encourage
people to transgress this prohibition, which is, of course, exactly what this [1992
get] bill does." Malinowitz, supra note 240, at 13.
244. Telephone Interview with J. David Bleich, Orthodox Rabbis, Professor of
Jewish Law and Ethics, Cardozo School of Law of Yeshiva University (Mar. 2,
1994).
245. Jacob, supra note 240, at 41.
246. Id. at 37.
247. Id. at 38.
248. The 1992 amendments utilize the definition of "barrier to remarriage"
provided by the 1983 get statute. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAw § 253(6). See supra note
148.
249. "Surely, it makes no sense whatsoever to punish a husband for failure to
carry out a court order, which is impossible for him to perform, especially where it
is the very compulsion of the court order that creates the impossibility of performance." Jacob, supra note 240, at 38. See also Gaudily D. Schwartz, Comments on
the New York State "Get Law", J. HALAcHA & CONTEMP. SOC'Y, Spring 1994, at 26
(asserting, in defense of the 1992 get law, that rabbinical courts can readily distinguish when a man is giving a get under duress, thereby safeguarding against the
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quently, Jacob concludes, the 1992 get law in fact narrows Justice Rigler's decision in the Schwartz case, which treated
barriers to remarriage as a direct consideration in making equi250
table distribution and setting maintenance.
More important than which interpretation of the 1992 get
law is arguably correct, is how state courts will apply the law in
actual practice. Ironically, to date, the only decision by a New
York State court applying the 1992 get law was issued by Justice Rigler in the Schwartz case, 251 the same case that engendered the law's enactment. Although Justice Rigler ruled in
March 1992 that a court could consider a spouse's withholding
of the get in dividing marital assets or setting maintenance, the
court did not make its final determination on the economic issues in Schwartz until October 1994-after the 1992 get law
252
had been enacted.
In this second Schwartz decision, Justice Rigler found as a
factual matter that the defendant had intentionally withheld
the get from his wife as a means of obtaining a greater share of
the couple's marital property. 253 "Clearly, defendant comes to
this court with unclean hands," Rigler stated, holding that, in
these circumstances, the court's equitable powers under the
1992 get law should be invoked. 254 Applying the law to the
Schwartz's marital property, Rigler then ruled that, by his acexecution of invalid gittin). Rabbi Schwartz is the head of the bet din of the
Rabbinical Council of America and of the bet din of the Chicago Rabbinical
Council.
250. Jacob, supra note 240, at 38.
251. Schwartz v. Schwartz, N.Y. L.J., Oct. 12, 1994, at 27 (Sup. Ct. Kings
County Oct. 12, 1994).
252. Id. In Schwartz, Justice Rigler conducted a bifurcated divorce trial. In
the first part of the trial, decided in March 1992, the court granted plaintiff Naomi
Schwartz a divorce judgment and ruled, as a legal matter, that the court could
consider the parties' actions regarding the get in making equitable distribution of
marital assets and setting maintenance. Schwartz v. Schwartz, 153 Misc. 2d 789,
583 N.Y.S.2d 716 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1992). See also supra notes 151-54 and
accompanying text. What remained to be decided in the second part of the trial
was the actual determination of equitable distribution, maintenance, and counsel
fees. Schwartz, N.Y. L.J., Oct. 12, 1994, at 27. Recognizing the odd sequence of
events surrounding both Schwartz decisions, and the excitement of the 1992 get
law, Justice Rigler stated in his second decision: "It is ironic that the case that
engendered the new 'GET statute' should be the very same case in which this court
is required to apply the Statute." Id.
253. Schwartz, N.Y. L.J., Oct. 12, 1994, at 27.
254. Id.
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tions in withholding the get, defendant had forfeited his claim to
one-half of the increased value of his wife's stock in The Jewish
Press-anamount valued at $184,500.255

This second Schwartz decision indicates that, while Marvin
56
Jacob's narrow interpretation of the 1992 get law is feasible,
in fact courts are likely to apply the law more broadly, in the
nature of a financial penalty.257 Significantly, by the time Justice Rigler rendered his decision on equitable distribution in
Schwartz, the defendant had already granted plaintiff Naomi
Schwartz a get and both parties had remarried. 258 Thus, Justice
Rigler's invocation of the 1992 get law to deny Mr. Schwartz a
share of assets to which he otherwise would have been entitled
cannot be justified on grounds that Naomi Schwartz faced a prospective economic disadvantage due to her inability to remarry.
Rather, Justice Rigler's decision imposes exactly the sort of financial penalty that some opponents of the 1992 get law argue
will invalidate a get,259 and other opponents urge renders the
260
law unconstitutional.
Far from settling the controversy over the 1992 get law,
Justice Rigler's recent holding in Schwartz is likely to further
sharpen the halachic divide. For those who support any legislative initiative that helps agunot to obtain gittin and receives
significant, if not unanimous, halachic backing, the 1992 get
law is worthwhile. But for those who believe that any proposed

255. Id. See also Ronald Sullivan, Refusing to Agree to a Religious Divorce
Proves Costly, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 5, 1994, at B3 ("The refusal of an Orthodox Jewish
man to grant his wife a religious divorce cost him more than $180,000 yesterday,
when a Brooklyn judge ruled that the husband's obstinacy and pressure to extract
financial concessions were grounds for forfeiting any claim to a larger share of the
couple's marital wealth.").
256. See supra notes 245-50 for a discussion of Jacob's interpretation of the
1992 get law.
257. See Sullivan, supra note 255, at B3 (reporting that Anthony Daniele,
lawyer for Naomi Schwartz, "said the ruling was the first in New York State in
which a husband was financially penalized in a civil court for withholding a religious divorce."). Nor did Justice Rigler perceive the 1992 get law as narrowing his
earlier decision, as Jacob contends. To the contrary, Rigler stated in his decision
that the 1992 get law "in essence codified this court's position." Schwartz, N.Y.
L.J., Oct. 12, 1994, at 27.
258. Schwartz, N.Y. L.J., Oct. 12, 1994, at 27.
259. See supra notes 241-43 and accompanying text for a criticism of the 1992
get law.
260. See supra notes 235-37 and accompanying text.
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solution to the agunah problem must receive universal halachic
approval before being implemented, the 1992 get law stands as
an abysmal failure that threatens the entire Jewish
community.
3.

QuantifiableEffects of the 1992 Get Law

The 1992 get law is regarded by opponents as a threat in
large part because it has the potential to be extremely effective.
In contrast to the 1983 get statute, early accounts indicate that
the 1992 law has the "teeth" lacking in the earlier law. 261 "It is

really potentially a tremendous tool in the hands of women,"
said Rivka Haut. "It finally gives women a balance of power." 262
David Long reported that the 1992 law has been the determining factor for several women receiving religious divorces with
G.E.T.'s help. "Almost simultaneously with the signing of the
law," Long said, "there were cases that had been kicking around
for a while that suddenly resolved themselves. In many instances, the mere fact that people knew that it was on the books
caused things to be resolved."26 3 Similarly, Larry Rothbart described the Brooklyn family court as "quieter" with regard to get
cases since Justice Rigler's decision in Schwartz and the enactment of the 1992 law. 26 "Apparently, people are following the

law," Rothbart said. "The holding up of the get seems to be a
26 5
little less of an issue."

One reason for the law's effectiveness is its preemptive
force which, in effect, gives as much power to lawyers who use
the law as a negotiating tool as it does to courts in dividing marital assets. 26 6 Jeffrey Sunshine said that when he represents
261. Deborah Eifferman called the 1992 amendment "far more effective" in
helping agunot than the 1983 get statute. "The amendment counteracts some of
the lack in the original law," she said. Telephone Interview with Deborah Eifferman, International Vice President, ICAR (Mar. 2, 1994).
262. Telephone Interview with Rivka Haut, Director, AGUNAH, Founder,
ICAR (Mar. 6, 1994).
263. Telephone Interview with David Long, Attorney, Chairman of the Board,
G.E.T. (Mar. 2, 1994).
264. Telephone Interview with Larry Rothbart, Legal Secretary to Justice
Rigler (Mar. 7, 1994) (Justice Rigler decided the Schwartz case).
265. Id.
266. But see Jacob, supra note 240, at 38 (maintaining that the true power of
the law resides neither with courts nor lawyers but with rabbinical courts, which
can prevent the law's application with a finding of coercion).
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Orthodox women he typically informs opposing counsel that he
will seek application of the 1992 law if the husband fails to give
a get. "Usually that resolves the question," Sunshine said.267
Similarly, Harvey Jacobs recounted that in situations in which
he has employed these preemptive tactics, any issue over the
delivery of a get resolved itself prior to court determination of
26
equitable distribution. 8
Despite these positive reports, the controversy generated
by the 1992 law has also had the negative effect of discouraging
some agunot from seeking the law's help. Caseworkers at
G.E.T. and Get Free report that, in light of the halachic controversy surrounding the law, some Orthodox women are afraid to
utilize it for fear that it will produce an invalid get. 26 9 "Women
are just weary," said Ruth Englart, a case consultant at G.E.T.
"They hear some rabbis saying it's not kosher, others say that it
is. So I think they're just really afraid at this point to deal with
it."270

Moreover, according to Rivka Haut the halachic contro-

versy over the law has produced a backlash, in which women
are being pushed to litigate everything in a bet din and not go to
civil court. 27 1 Many women would rather forego the law's protection than incur the social ostracism that would accompany
their decision to litigate in a secular court, Haut said.272 The
implications of this backlash are serious; although the 1992 get
law may potentially help many agunot, in some cases it has already had the negative and unforeseen effect of making their
situation worse by frustrating the state's ability to help them at
all.

267. Telephone Interview with Jeffrey Sunshine, Matrimonial Attorney (Mar.
21, 1994).
268. Telephone Interview with Harvey Jacobs, Matrimonial Attorney (Mar. 7,
1994).
269. Telephone Interview with Yehuda Levin, Caseworker, Get Free (Mar. 14,
1994).
270. Telephone Interview with Ruth Englart, Case Consultant, G.E.T. (Mar.
2, 1994).
271. Telephone Interview with Rivka Haut, Director, AGUNAH, Founder,
ICAR (Mar. 6, 1994).
272. Id.
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UnquantifiableEffects of the 1992 Get Law

Like the 1983 get statute, the 1992 get law demonstrates
the state's ongoing concern for agunot and helps to educate and
sensitize courts, lawyers, and the general public to the agunah
problem.27 3 More important, however, has been the 1992 law's
unforeseen socio-religious impact upon the New York rabbinate.
In light of the controversy surrounding the law, some rabbinical
courts are scrutinizing husbands much more closely to ensure
that gittin are freely given.2 74 Moreover, rabbis who oppose the
law are being pressured to develop alternative solutions to the
agunah problem that would eliminate or minimize the need for
secular court involvement (several of these proposals are discussed at length in the next section).27 5 Although these rabbinic
initiatives have not been triggered solely, or even directly, by
the 1992 get law, the controversy and national media coverage
sparked by the law have at least contributed to the increasing
feeling among rabbis that more must be done to solve the prob27 6
lem internally.
273. See, e.g, Elaine Rudnick-Sheps, The 'Get' Law & Agunos, JEWISH PRESS,
Aug. 14, 1992, at 60 (reporting that the American Academy of Matrimonial Law,
New York Chapter, established a Committee on the 1992 get law to bring the issue
to the attention of attorneys nationwide).
274. E.g., Telephone Interview with Kenneth Auman, Orthodox Rabbi (Mar.
2, 1994). Rabbi Auman noted that some rabbinical courts "are being much more
careful in terms of the questions they ask the husbands" while others are proceeding "business as usual, as if there's no difference." Id.
275. Zwiebel, supra note 71, at 8. "[W]e must redouble our efforts to find other
ways of dealing with the tragic agunathi problem, communal approaches that enjoy the halachic support of all circles," proclaimed Dovid Zwiebel. "To permit the
frustrations of the 1992 legislative experience to cause us to throw up our hands in
despair, and simply assign the aguna problem to the 'Tsk, Tsk, What a Shame' file,
would be one of the saddest legacies of the entire sorry episode." Id.
276. The movement of the Orthodox rabbinate toward the local and national
implementation of more effective internal solutions to the agunah problem has
taken place over many years, as many rabbis have increasingly realized that get
extortion is not disappearing and that new solutions to the problem must be found.
Rabbi Kenneth Brander asserted that many members of the Rabbinical Council of
America (RCA) have only a general awareness of the New York get legislation,
such that recent actions by the RCA to address the agunah problem were in a way
responding to the 1992 get law. Similarly, the G.E.T. organization has lobbied for
various proposed solutions to get extortion for the better part of fifteen years. Telephone Interview with Deborah Eifferman, International Vice President, ICAR
(Mar. 2, 1994).
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Even if the 1992 get law induces some rabbis to seek alternative solutions more aggressively, this positive effect must be
viewed against the threat of the current controversy to permanently damage the Orthodox community. It is yet unclear
whether the divisiveness sparked by the 1992 get law will leave
permanent scars. While some predict that any wounds inflicted
by the current halachic controversy will probably not be seri27 8
ous, 277 others are less optimistic.
The crucial question, therefore, is whether the 1992 get
law-or any get law-can be considered "good" absent halachic
consensus. The answer must be no. Although the potential of
the 1992 get law to help agunot makes it extremely compelling,
it has engendered negative side-effects that legislators never intended. Political infighting among rabbinic authorities and
Jewish organizations, confusion on the part of Orthodox women
about whether to seek the law's assistance, community backlash against those women who do-all of these unintended,
negative by-products of the 1992 legislation have already materialized in the New York Orthodox community. Moreover, the
most threatening social cost of all, which looms as a distinct future possibility, is that some rabbis will invalidate gittin received by women pursuant to the 1992 law. If this were to
happen-and even supporters of the law cannot deny the possibility-the 1992 get law could permanently divide the Orthodox
community or, even worse, harm the very women it was intended to help.
Supporters of the 1992 law may counter that the 1992 law's
immense social benefits of reducing get extortion and sparing
women the burden of becoming agunot far outweigh the law's
negative effects, some of which may never materialize. This
cost-benefit analysis may be correct, but it overlooks another
277. Telephone Interview with Kenneth Auman, Orthodox Rabbi (Mar. 2,
1994). "Organizationally," Auman said, "you often have a lot of different fights
[within the Orthodox community]. When it boils down to it, it doesn't always make
much of a difference." Id.
278. Telephone Interview with Marvin Schick, Publisher, Journalof Halacha
and Contemporary Society (Mar. 7, 1994). Schick said that the recent halachic
conflict has left the Orthodox community "bitterly divided," commenting that
"[elven assuming that there is a legitimate issue here, that there is room for disagreement, there is no good reason one can point to to explain the intensity of this
conflict except... that religious conflict has an inextricable capacity to get out of
hand, to breed intensity."
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major drawback of the 1992 get law: Beyond its social costs, the
law has implicitly forced the state to take sides in a religious
dispute. The law's continued operation in the face of a divisive
halachic debate has, in effect, lent state support to one set of
religious beliefs over another. From this perspective, who is
"right" in the halachic dispute over the 1992 law matters far
less than the fact that, because the dispute exists, the law's actual operation constitutes a violation of First Amendment principles. Even after its brief operation, it is apparent that the
1992 get law has had the effect of entangling the state in a religious dispute. As such, it cannot stand.
V. A Comparative Analysis: Is Civil Legislation A Good
Solution To The Agunah Problem?
Both supporters and opponents of the New York get legislation overwhelmingly agree that civil legislation is not the best
way to solve the agunah problem. 279 Beyond the flaws of the
New York get laws, and beyond the constitutional and halachic
parameters that constrain any legislative initiatives in this
area, inherent limitations in get legislation make it at best a
partial solution to the agunah problem. First, get legislation
such as the 1983 and 1992 get laws, which apply to those seeking civil divorces, cannot help the many agunot who are already
civilly divorced.2 0 A second problem is that many agunot face
religious, 2 1 social,28 2 and economic2 8 3 barriers that prevent
them from seeking the aid of civil courts, regardless of the law's
279. Of all the commentators interviewed, only Marvin Jacob thought that
the combination of the 1983 and 1992 get laws presented the best available solution. Telephone Interview with Marvin E. Jacob, Attorney, Weil, Gotshal, &
Manges, New York, N.Y., Adjunct Professor of Law, New York Law School (Feb.
28, 1994).
280. Significantly, a tort law that established the refusal to give a get as the
intentional infliction of emotional harm would be available to agunot, whether
civilly divorced or not. Nathan Lewin said he has proposed the creation of this
type of statutory remedy, but that rabbinic authorities have told him such legislation would raise serious halachic problems. Telephone Interview with Nathan
Lewin, Attorney, Miller, Cassidy, Larroca & Lewin, Washington, D.C. (Apr. 7,
1994). Constitutional problems would be raised as well. See supra note 117 and
accompanying text.
281. Orthodox women and men are prohibited from resolving their marital
disputes in secular courts absent permission from a bet din. See supra note 31.
282. See supra text accompanying notes 271-72, discussing social backlash
against Orthodox women who go to civil court.
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effectiveness. Finally, for those organizations and individuals
who seek a national or international solution to the agunah
problem, even good civil legislation is geographically limited to
the citizens of a particular jurisdiction.
While commentators thus agree that the best (and perhaps
only) solution to the agunah problem must come from within
the Jewish community itself, there is far less consensus on what
that internal resolution should be. This section will look at
three models for internal redress of the agunah problem that
are now in various stages of implementation in the Jewish community. In this broader context, it will then reconsider the appropriate role of civil legislation in addressing the agunah
problem.
A. IncreasedApplication of Community Pressure
One approach to solving the agunah problem advocates the
more aggressive application of traditional forms of community
pressure. Even those commentators who participated in the
drafting of the 1983 get statute agree that the New York Jewish
community could have done more to address the agunah problem before turning to civil legislation. "I thought that the
rabbis were not taking enough authority in using their bully
pulpits to put pressure on men," said Alan Dershowitz. 284 Similarly, Aaron Twerski continues to believe that "with significant
community pressure we could probably reduce the problem by
5
95 percent." 2
In the last several years, various initiatives have been
launched at the national and local levels to make community
pressure a more effective remedy. New organizations have been
formed that help agunot by pressuring recalcitrant spouses to
deliver gittin.286 Rabbinic organizations, including Agudath
283. Many Orthodox women simply lack the economic resources needed to finance the sizable attorney's fees associated with litigation.
284. Telephone Interview with Alan Dershowitz, Professor of Law, Harvard
Law School (Feb. 16, 1994).
285. Telephone Interview with Aaron Twerski, Professor of Law, Brooklyn
Law School, Officer, Agudath Israel (Mar. 2, 1994).
286. Get Free was founded in 1992. See also Vaad Harabanimof FarRockaway Agunah Fund,JEWISH PRESS, June 26, 1992, at 53 (announcing the establishment of a new organization in the Far Rockaway section of New York dedicated to
helping agunot).
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Israel and the Rabbinical Council of America (RCA), have endorsed the increased imposition of synagogual sanctions on recalcitrant spouses. 28 7 In Canada, a nationwide campaign has
been launched in which major Jewish organizations and synagogues have agreed to deny both membership and leadership
positions to individuals who refuse to participate in the get process. 288 Finally, continued efforts by organizations like The
Jewish Press, AGUNAH and G.E.T. to draw local and national
attention to the plight of agunot have contributed to the growing feeling in Jewish communities that abuse of the get process
cannot be tolerated.
The problem with the community pressure model is not its
lack of support, but rather the difficulty in making it work. Especially in places like New York City where the absence of any
unified leadership in the Orthodox community makes well-coordinated community pressure difficult. Furthermore, given the
decentralized nature of city life and the mobility of people in the
United States, many recalcitrant spouses can escape community pressure simply by moving to another state or, in some
cases, another street. Finally, and perhaps most significantly,
the underlying force that historically made community pressure
so effective in earlier times-the power of rabbinical courts to
28 9
enforce their orders-is absent in the United States today.
Consequently, although in many cases community pressure can
and does help agunot, in cases in which spiteful husbands will
go to any length to avoid giving gittin, even heightened community pressure will be ineffective.
B.

Utilization of PrenuptialAgreements

A second proposed remedy to the agunah problem that has
been espoused by many Orthodox rabbis in New York and else287. At its 1993 convention, the RCA adopted a resolution that imposes strict
synagogual sanctions upon any recalcitrant spouse who ignores the summons of a
bet din. The approved sanctions include preclusion from holding membership or
office in the synagogue; preclusion from being called to read the Torah or receiving
any other honor; and the regular announcement in synagogues of the names of
recalcitrant spouses. Zwiebel, supra note 71, at 8 n.14.
288. Telephone Interview with Norma Baumel Joseph, Founder and President, ICAR (Mar. 21, 1994). "This takes it back into the community realm, which
is of course where we want it." Id.
289. See supra note 31.
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where is the utilization of prenuptial agreements. 290 In these
agreements, the bride and groom agree to submit to the jurisdiction of a rabbinical court in the event of marital dissolution,
and to abide by contractual provisions that either encourage or
require the delivery or acceptance of a get. 291 The prenuptial
agreement has numerous advantages: it works preemptively
rather than after the problem has already arisen; it can be uniformly implemented on a national level; and finally, while prenuptial agreements are designed to be legally enforceable,
many rabbis hail the fact that they encourage spouses to resolve
their problems in rabbinical, not secular, courts. "The prenuptial agreement, in my mind, is the only hope of any kind of solution," asserted Rabbi Kenneth Auman. 292 According to Rabbi
Haskel Lookstein, "If prenuptial agreements would be signed
routinely at every wedding, we could wipe out this problem
293
entirely."
Although several different versions of prenuptial agreements are currently in use, the one drafted by Rabbi Mordechai
Willig has been the most widely circulated and has received official RCA backing.294 The Willig prenuptial agreement creates a
financial incentive for a husband to give a get in the event of
marital breakdown by obligating him to make fixed support
payments to his wife from the time they separate to the time he
grants her a religious divorce. 295 Rabbi Kenneth Brander, who
chaired the RCA committee on prenuptial agreements, explained that, unlike the 1992 get law, this provision raises no
halachic concerns because a man is already obligated under
Jewish law to financially support his wife for as long they are
290. The RCA's endorsement of prenuptial agreements at its 1993 convention
has been hailed by many as an important step in solving the agunah problem. See
Zwiebel, supra note 71, at 8 (declaring that the RCA's agunah-relatedinitiatives
"deserve to be given careful study by all who recognize the gravity of the problem
and the urgency of its compelling demand for attention and amelioration").
291. Premarital agreements would therefore compensate for the lack of an arbitration clause in the Orthodox ketubah. See supra notes 109, 113.
292. Telephone Interview with Kenneth Auman, Orthodox Rabbi (Mar. 2,
1994).
293. Lookstein, supra note 42, at 4, 48 (Rabbi Lookstein is the leader of Congregation Kehilath Jeshrun and the principal of the Ramaz School in Manhattan).
294. A copy of this prenuptial agreement is attached at Appendix B.
295. To adjust for inflation, the amount set for support is indexed to the consumer price index. See Appendix B.
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married: "So we're not fining the husband," Brander said, "[a]ll
we're doing is actualizing in very definitive terms what his rewilling to change that [marital]
sponsibilities are as he is not
296
status quo and give the get."

The Willig prenuptial agreement is not free of problems,
however. Some commentators, including both J. David Bleich
and Marvin Jacob, assert that, because the support provision in
the Willig agreement requires the husband to pay a fixed sum
that is unrelated to the parties' actual financial circumstances
at the time of separation, it may be struck down by secular
courts as a penalty clause. 297 Consequently, Jacob cautions that

the Willig prenuptial agreement is "lulling people into a false
sense of security," when in fact it may subsequently be deemed
legally unenforceable. 298
A second drawback is that prenuptial agreements can effectively solve the agunah problem only to the extent that rabbis
in the community widely utilize them. Although some rabbis
now refuse to perform marriage ceremonies without them, most
rabbis do not take this approach; concerned that prenuptial
agreements might not be right for every couple, and could actually plant the seeds of marital discord, many rabbis hesitate to
insist upon them.2 9 This obstacle could be easily overcome if
296. Telephone Interview with Kenneth Brander, Orthodox Rabbi, Chair,
RCA Committee on prenuptial agreements (Feb. 16, 1994).

297. In contract law, penalty clauses are invalid. Rabbi Bleich has proposed
an alternative prenuptial agreement that he says establishes support as a right,

not a penalty. Telephone Interview with J. David Bleich, Orthodox Rabbi, Professor of Jewish Law and Ethics, Cardozo School of Law of Yeshiva University (Mar.

2, 1994).
298. Telephone Interview with Marvin Jacob, Attorney, Weil, Gotshal, &

Manges, New York, N.Y., Adjunct Professor of Law, New York Law School (Feb.
28, 1993). To date, however, no court has confronted this issue. Cf Adrienne

Marks, PrenuptialAgreements As a Solution to Agunah Problem, JEWISH PRESS,
July 24, 1992, at 60 (advising couples who enter into prenuptial agreements to
consult with experienced attorneys to ensure enforceability).
299. Rabbi Lookstein asserts that these concerns could be easily overcome if
rabbis explained the prenuptial agreement to marrying couples "as a mark of love
and responsibility where each partner wants to protect the other in the event of
any change in the relationship. It should be presented as something which is done
not alone for a particular couple but, rather, for the entire community." Lookstein,
supra note 42, at 48. See also Sylvia Mandelbaum, Save the Victimized Agunah,
JEWISH PRESS, Aug. 21, 1992, at 10 ("The safest ocean-liner carries life boats -

just in case. Entering into a marriage with complete trust, by shaping each other's
hopes and intentions is the best form of marriage insurance").
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marrying couples themselves insisted on signing a prenuptial
agreement. However, prevailing social attitudes often discourage couples on the brink of marriage from entering into agreements that contemplate divorce. Consequently, although
prenuptial agreements represent a promising solution to the
agunah problem, their successful implementation depends upon
the reform of social and rabbinic attitudes. Such reform is already occurring, but slowly. Other solutions are required in the
interim.
C. Religious Reform

-

"Halachic Reinterpretation"

The third and most controversial approach to solving the
agunah problem proposes the reform of Jewish law, deemed by
some as "halachic reinterpretation." Proponents of this approach assert that, at its core, the agunah problem is a halachic
problem that demands a halachic solution; toward this end, organizations world-wide united in 1993 to form the International
Coalition for Agunah Rights (ICAR). ICAR's ultimate goal is to
procure from distinguished Israeli rabbis one or more halachic
solutions to the agunah problem that can be universally
implemented. 3o
But labels like "reform" and "reinterpretation" are controversial, because proponents maintain that solutions to the
agunah problem already exist in Jewish law. By this account,
what requires reform is not halachic doctrine, but rather the
unwillingness of rabbis to implement any remotely innovative
approach to help agunot, even if it has precedent in Jewish law.
Rabbinic conservativeness, proponents declare, disregards that
Jewish law accords the highest priority to freeing agunot,30 1 and
300. Telephone Interview with Deborah Eifferman, International Vice President, ICAR (Mar. 2, 1994). The organization has already made strides. Eifferman
reported that, in response to ICAR's efforts, distinguished Israeli rabbis have
agreed to establish an ad hoc committee composed of scholars, rabbis, and ICAR
members that will address halachic approaches to the agunah problem.
301. See Jacob, supra note 240, at 37:
"Nowadays, if one frees a single Agunah from the chains of her Iygun
[plight], it is as if he rebuilt one of the desolate places of Jerusalem on high."
T'shuvos Maharsham in the name of the T'shuvos HaBach Hachadoshos, Pt.
1, Siman 84; "It is a matter of greatest importance, and may God bring success to all who toil in these great matters involving remedies for the daughters of Israel." Igros Moshe, Even HaEzer, Pt. 4, Siman 106.
Id. (quoting Talmudic sources).
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that rabbis have historically implemented many creative solutions to do so. "I have no doubt," said Rivka Haut, "that if the
rabbis of the Talmud were here today, this agunah situation
30 2
wouldn't exist."
One frequently offered example of the halachic mandate to
help agunot is that, in order to spare from agunah status a woman whose husband has disappeared, Jewish law lowers its
normally stringent testimonial requirements and accepts testimony from almost anyone claiming to have witnessed her husband's death.3°3 "When it comes to an agunah,"declared Rabbi
Sholom Mass, "we accept aidose, testimony, from anyone, even
from a relative, a woman, a slave, even from those normally disqualified as witnesses, even from a child and an honest Gentile.
We do everything to make it easier to free the chained
304
woman."
Several halachic solutions to the agunah problem have
been proposed. One proposal is to release agunot from dead
30 5
marriages through retroactive annulments of the marriage.
Although the concept of annulment has precedent in Jewish
law, it has never been widely implemented as a means of helping agunot.3°6 However, some rabbis have recently begun to use
this approach, with one rabbi even proposing the establishment
307
of a "Special Rabbinical Court for Annulments."
A second proposal is to have marrying couples sign an undated, conditional divorce, called a tenai get, prior to the wedding ceremony. In the event of separation, if the husband
refuses to give his wife a get in violation of Jewish law, the bet
din could then date the agreement and declare the woman free
302. Telephone Interview with Rivka Haut, Director, AGUNAH, Founder,
ICAR (Mar. 6, 1994).
303. Only the confirmable death of a spouse will dissolve the marriage. See
supra note 2.
304. Rabbi Sholom Klass, Religious Annulment of a Marriage: The Editor Replies, JEWISH PRESS, June 19, 1992, at 62B.
305. See Rabbi Sholom Klass, Freeing an Agunah: The Editor'sResponse, JEWISH PRESS, July 3, 1992, at 35 (advocating annulment as a valid way of freeing
agunot).
306. Telephone Interview with Kenneth Auman, Orthodox Rabbi (Mar. 2,
1994). While the retroactive nullification of marriage was used in ancient times, it
has not been regularly implemented in over fifteen hundred years.
307. See Emanuel Rackman, Parole for Prisoners, JEWISH PRESS, June 12,
1992, at 25.
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to remarry. According to Rabbi Bernard Zlotowitz, this mechanism was widely employed by rabbis during World War II to
prevent women from becoming agunot if their husbands became
308
missing in action.
A third proposal, which Rabbi Moshe Antelman has controversially implemented in several cases, is to allow a bet din to
itself certify a get in situations where the husband has effectively abandoned his wife. 309 "It's a mitzvah [good deed] for a
man to give his wife the right to dual divorce," Antelman said.
"If he doesn't want to do it, the bet din can do it for him."310 This
halachic approach, which is considered radical, would effectively eliminate a woman's dependence upon her husband as
the exclusive authority who can allow her to remarry.3 11
Although a halachicsolution to the agunah problem would
be ideal, all of the above mentioned proposals have met with the
sharp criticism of rabbis who deem them halachically invalid.3 12
Moreover, many other rabbis simply refuse to endorse any proposal that is controversial. Echoing the dispute over the 1992
get law, a key point of disagreement is whether unanimous halachic consensus is required before any approach to help agunot
can be implemented. Answering this question in the affirmative, Dovid Zwiebel declared:
Here is an area where you almost have to, by definition, be conservative. If you move in a direction that is not accepted by the
full spectrum of rabbinic authority, you could have a tragic situation where a woman has a get and in some segments of the community is considered able to remarry, and in other segments of
the community is considered still unable to remarry. 3 13
308. Telephone Interview with Bernard Zlotowitz, Reform Rabbi (Feb. 24,
1994).
309. Telephone Interview with Moshe Antelman, Scientist, Orthodox Rabbi
(Mar. 7, 1994).
310. Id.
311. Despite the controversial nature of this approach, Antelman asserts that
he has located historical evidence demonstrating that some rabbinical courts have
in fact employed this solution in the past. Id.
312. See Rabbi Chaim Z. Malinowitz, A Response to Rabbi Rackman, JEWISH
PRESS, June 26, 1992, at 34 (criticizing Rabbi Rackman's proposal to establish a
rabbinical court for the annulment of marriage as having "absolutely no practical
halachic basis").
313. Telephone Interview with Dovid Zwiebel, Legal Counsel to Agudath
Israel (Feb. 21, 1994).
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On the other side of the debate, supporters of halachicsolutions
(most of whom also support the 1992 get law) assert that halachic disagreement should not thwart the more pressing need
to help women get on with their lives. Given this divide, and
the conservative climate among the New York rabbinate, the
odds of any halachic approach receiving unanimous or even major backing are slim.
The foregoing survey of proposed internal solutions to the
agunah problem demonstrates that no one approach has commanded universal approval. Moreover, there may be no one
"best" solution. Given the many social and religious dimensions
of the problem, 314 a variety of solutions will be required to solve
it. The combined force of local community pressure, national
implementation of prenuptial agreements, and international efforts to find halachic remedies offers the greatest hope for wiping out get extortion and the agunah problem. However, it
remains to be seen whether any of these approaches will gain
the widespread rabbinic support required for their successful
implementation.
It is against this backdrop of imperfect solutions that one
must consider the appropriate role of civil legislation in addressing the agunah problem. Those who oppose get legislation
of any kind insist that the Jewish community must not look to
the state to solve its problems.3 15 This approach is compelling,
but ignores the fact that the persistent inability of the Jewish
community to solve the agunah problem is part of the problem
itself. While the Jewish community is making strides toward
possible solutions, the immediate and pressing nature of the
agunah problem justifies that all practical, interim solutions be
explored, including those that look to civil legislation. As Nathan Lewin asserts:
I admire and can agree with those who say, "Look, we ought not to
turn to the legislature to solve our problems." And, you know, if
this were a perfect world then I'd say fine, let's solve our own
314. See generally supra part I.
315. One vocal advocate of this view is Marvin Schick, President of the Rabbi
Jacob Joseph Schools, publisher of the Journalof Halachaand ContemporarySociety, and founder of the National Jewish Commission on Law & Public Affairs
(COLPA). Telephone Interview with Marvin Schick, President, Rabbi Jacob Joseph Schools (Mar. 7, 1994).
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problems. But that's not reality. And when you deal with reality
and real people's problems, you shouldn't wait until the messiah
3 16
comes to resolve them or get a consensus of religious view.
But here too there is a problem; for while all legislative initiatives that can help agunot should be pursued, it is difficult to
draft any get law that stays within constitutional and halachic
317 Comparameters, and helps agunot in significant numbers.
parison of the 1983 and 1992 New York get laws aptly demonstrates that civil legislation aimed at helping agunot carries
with it a serious tradeoff: the more aggressive the law, the
harder it will be to tread the thin line between constitutionality
and halachic validity on one hand, and religious entanglement
and controversy on the other. The 1983 get statute has tread
this tightrope well, but the price has been that it helps few women. The 1992 get law has far greater potential to help agunot,
but the cost of its effectiveness has been a religious controversy
with harmful social ramifications and unconstitutional effects.
Thus, while in theory civil legislation designed to help agunot
seems like an attractive option, in practice it is problematic,
suggesting that future efforts would be better devoted to other
solutions.
The quest for alternative solutions must not abandon the
legal system, however. As evinced by the recent movement toward prenuptial agreements, given the reality that rabbinical
courts in the United States cannot enforce their own orders,
even "internal" solutions to the agunah problem must contemplate the possibility of judicial enforcement. The challenge,
therefore, is not to eliminate the state's role in helping agunot,
but rather to deliberately advance it in ways that minimize the
risk of state entanglement, religious controversy, and the judicial misapplication of Jewish law.
The most promising avenue in this regard is the civil enforcement of private agreements. As the holdings in Wax-

316. Telephone Interview with Nathan Lewin, Attorney, Miller, Cassidy, Larroca & Lewin, Washington, D.C. (Apr. 7, 1994).
317. This is at least true of civil legislation passed in the United States. In
other countries, such as Canada, the constitutional obstacles to get legislation may
be less restrictive. See supra note 229.
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stein, 18 Stern,319 and Avitzur32 ° indicate, New York courts are
willing to specifically enforce contractual terms that require
parties to cooperate in the Jewish divorce process. This important avenue of relief must be pursued. Compared to civil legislation, private agreements can more easily avoid halachic and
constitutional pitfalls because concerns raised by ordering the
performance of a religious act are diminished (if not eliminated)
when parties have expressly agreed to such performance. More
importantly, private agreements can circumvent constitutional
and halachic obstacles to specific performance by indirectly
pressuring a man to deliver a get. For instance, by requiring
husbands to make support payments to their wives until the
spouses are religiously divorced, the Willig prenuptial agreement pressures recalcitrant husbands to deliver gittin without
32 1
raising First Amendment obstacles to civil enforcement.
Likewise, in the Rubin case, both spouses were indirectly pressured to cooperate in a Jewish divorce because the legal enforceability of their settlement agreement was conditioned upon the
delivery and acceptance of a get.32 2 Similar provisions, which
help to curb abuse of the get process, should be developed.
The legal system will never be able to solve the agunah
problem. However, it can be of real assistance to the Jewish
23
community and to individual agunot through the monitoring
and enforcement of private agreements between Jewish
spouses. The impetus is now upon the Jewish community to
promote their utilization.

318. 90 Misc. 2d 784, 395 N.Y.S.2d 877 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1976), aff'd, 57
A.D.2d 863, 394 N.Y.S.2d 253 (2d Dep't 1977). See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
319. 5 Fam. L. Rep. (BNA) 2810 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1979). See supra notes
101-03 and accompanying text.
320. 58 N.Y.2d 108, 446 N.E.2d 136, 459 N.Y.S.2d 572, cert. denied, 464 U.S.
817 (1983). See supra notes 110-15 and accompanying text.
321. See supra note 297-98 and accompanying text.
322. 75 Misc. 2d 776, 348 N.Y.S.2d 61 (Faro. Ct. Bronx County 1973). See
supra note 94 and accompanying text.
323. Following the lead of Golding and Pert, New York courts should and most
likely will continue to void private agreements in which wives agree to extortionate terms in order to obtaingittin. See supra notes 118-21 and accompanying text.
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APPENDIX A:
Table of Commentators Interviewed and
Their Affiliated Organizations

List of Commentators Interviewed
is both a practicing scientist and Orthodox
rabbi who divides his time between Israel and Rhode Island.
He serves on rabbinical courts in both locations. Telephone Interview on March 7, 1994.
MosHE ANTELMAN

AUMAN is an Orthodox rabbi who serves as rabbinical
advisor to the G.E.T. organization and chairman of an Orthodox
bet din in the Flatbush section of Brooklyn. Telephone Interview on March 2, 1994.
KENNETH

J. DAvID BLEICH is an Orthodox rabbi and a professor of Jewish

Law and Ethics at the Cardozo School of Law of Yeshiva University. He is currently the leading rabbinic opponent to the
1992 get legislation. See J. David Bleich, Jewish Divorce: Judicial Misconceptions and PossibleMeans of Civil Enforcement, 16
CoNN. L. REV. 201 (1984). Telephone Interview on March 2,
1994.
KENNETH BRANDER is a practicing Orthodox rabbi in Boca Raton, Florida. He also chairs the RCA committee on prenuptial
agreements. Telephone Interview on February 16, 1994.
CHAYA COOPER is the assistant director of Get Free. Telephone
Interview on March 14, 1994.
CYNTHIA CREEM is a practicing lawyer in Boston, Massachusetts
and a member of the Council for Family Law of the Massachusetts Bar Association. She is currently working on get legislation, modeled after New York's, that she hopes to introduce in
Massachusetts. Telephone Interview on March 14, 1994.
ANTHONY DANIELE

is a practicing matrimonial lawyer in New

York. He was plaintiff's attorney in the important Schwartz
case. Telephone Interview on February 14, 1994.
ALAN

DERSHOWITZ is a practicing lawyer in Massachusetts and

a professor of law at Harvard Law School. He participated in
the drafting of the 1983 New York get statute. Telephone Interview on February 16, 1994.
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is the International Vice President of the
International Coalition for Agunah Rights (ICAR). She formerly served as the casework manager for the G.E.T. organization. Telephone Interview on March 2, 1994.
DEBORAH EIFFERMAN

ALLEN

FISCHER is a practicing lawyer in New York City who is

an Orthodox Jew and represents mostly Orthodox clients. He
represented the plaintiff in the Pinkesz case. Telephone Interview on March 7, 1994.
PHILLIP HIAT is a Reform rabbi and an officer of the Federation

of Reform Synagogues. Telephone Interview on February 2,
1994.
is an Orthodox rabbi affiliated with Yeshiva University who was involved in drafting the prenuptial agreement
endorsed by the RCA. Telephone Interview on February 2,
1994.
ROBERT HIRT

RIVKA HAUT is one of the five directors of AGUNAH, and one of
the founders of ICAR. Telephone Interview on March 6, 1994.
MARvIN E. JACOB is a partner at the New York firm of Weil,

Gotshal, & Manges and an adjunct professor of law at New York
Law School. He also serves as the chairman of the Commission
on Law and Legislation of the Institute for Public Affairs of the
Orthodox Union. Mr. Jacob is regarded as a leading advocate in
support of the 1992 get statute. See Marvin Jacob, The Authentic Legal Explanation of the 1992 Amendments To Section 236B
of the Domestic Relations Law-The So-Called "Get Law", JEWISH PRESS, June 18, 1993, at 58-59. Telephone Interview on
February 28, 1994.
HARVEY JACOBS is a Brooklyn matrimonial lawyer whose clientele includes a large percentage of Orthodox Jews. Telephone
Interview on March 7, 1994.
NORMA BAUMEL JOSEPH

is a founder and the current president

of ICAR. She lives in Canada, where she has played an impor-

tant role in lobbying for Canadian get legislation. Telephone Interview on March 21, 1994.
RicHARD KuRTz is a matrimonial attorney in New York. He

represented the defendant in the Golding case and the plaintiff
in the Perl case. Telephone Interview on March 7, 1994.
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LEVIN is a caseworker at Get Free. Telephone Inter-

view on March 14, 1994.
NATHAN LEWIN is a partner at the Washington, D.C. firm of

Miller, Cassidy, Larroca & Lewin. He is regarded as a leading
expert on church-state questions, and was the primary drafter
of the 1983 get statute. Telephone Interview on April 7, 1994.
DAVm LONG is a lawyer who serves as chairman of the board of

the G.E.T. organization. Telephone Interview on March 2,
1994.
served as Agudath Israel's vice president
on government and public affairs at the time of the 1983 get
statute's enactment. Telephone Interview on February 21,
1994.
LARRY ROTHBART is the legal secretary of Justice Rigler, who
decided the Schwartz case. Telephone Interview on March 7,
1994.
MARVIN SCHICK is the president of the Rabbi Jacob Joseph
Schools in New York. He is also the publisher of the Journalof
Halachaand ContemporarySociety, and the founder of the National Jewish Commission on Law & Public Affairs (COLPA).
Telephone Interview on March 7, 1994.
MENACHEM LUBINSKY

SCHWARTZ is an Orthodox rabbi who leads Congregation
Ohab Zedek on Manhattan's Upper West Side and an officer of
the Rabbinical Council of America. See Allen Schwartz, ReALLEN

sponding to RecalcitrantHusbands(Letter), JEWISH PRESS, May

15, 1992, at 73. Telephone Interview on March 31, 1994.
DR.

ISAAC SKOLNIK is the director of Kayama. Telephone Inter-

view on February 28, 1994.
Amy SOLOMAN is the legislative director for New York Senator

Mark Connor, the chief sponsor of the 1983 get bill in the New
York State Senate. Telephone Interview on March 21, 1994.
is a professor of law at Pace University
School of Law. See Ralph M. Stein, Marriage Contracts Unsuited for Civil Courts, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 25, 1983, at A30. Telephone Interview on March 2, 1994.
RALPH MICHAEi STEIN
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is a matrimonial lawyer in Brooklyn whose
clientele include many Orthodox Jews. Telephone Interview on
March 21, 1994.
AARON TwERSKi is a professor of law at Brooklyn Law School
and an officer of Agudath Israel. He chaired the Agudath Israel
committee that drafted the 1983 get statute. Telephone Interview on March 21, 1994.
MORDECHAI WILLIG is the Orthodox rabbi who wrote the prenuptial agreement recently endorsed by the Rabbinical Council
of America. Telephone Interview on February 24, 1994.
BERNARD ZLOTOWITZ is a Reform rabbi who served as the director the New York Federation of Reform Synagogues at the time
of the 1983 get statute's enactment and strongly urged its veto.
See Bernard Zlotowitz, A Divorce Bill That Involves the State in
Religion, N.Y. TmiEs, July 18, 1983, at A14; Bernard Zlotowitz,
A Religious Requirement Imposed By Cuomo in "83,N.Y. TuIEs,
Sept. 26, 1984, at A22. Telephone Interview on February 24,
1994.
Dovm ZWIEBEL is the legal counsel to Agudath Israel. He is a
leading spokesman in opposition to the 1992 get law. See Dovid
Zwiebel, Tragedy Compounded: The Aguna Problem and New
York's ControversialNew "Get Law," JEWISH OBSERVER, Sept.
1993 at 1. Telephone Interview on February 21, 1994.
JEFFREY SUNSHINE

List of Affiliated Organizations
AGUDATH ISRAEL OF AMERICA is an organization, founded in
1922, that unites a broad coalition of Orthodox Jews under the
leadership of rabbinic scholars, and aims to advance Torah observance and the welfare of Jewish people in the United States
and around the world. Through its Office of Government Affairs, Agudath Israel has emerged as a leading advocate and
political force for the religious and civil rights of observant
Jews. Furthermore, Agudath Israel Of America's Commission
on Legislation and Civic Action is the prime governmental
spokesman and liaison for yeshivas (Jewish all-day schools),
synagogues, and community charitable causes before governmental and legislative bodies. The organization was primarily
responsible for the drafting of the 1983 get statute. It is also the
organization most fervently opposing the 1992 get law.
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AGUNAH is an organization of approximately 50 members
dedicated to rabbinic reform and finding halachic solutions to
the agunah problem. Its five directors are all women, and
AGUNAH accepts only women as clients.
GET FREE is a an organization that helps both men and women
obtain religious divorces through community pressure of recalcitrant spouses. It was founded in 1992 by an Orthodox Jew
whose daughter had difficulty obtaining a get. It has two paid
staff members and offers its services free of charge.

(G.E.T.) was founded in 1979
by Jewish men and women from lay and professional backgrounds "in response to a growing need to assist individuals
seeking a Jewish divorce from a recalcitrant spouse." G.E.T.
brochure. The organization accepts both women and men as clients, it assumes a non-adversarial role in its efforts to secure a
religious divorce, and it offers its services free of charge. G.E.T.
is endorsed both by rabbinic and lay organizations, and its
casework services are provided by over 200 volunteers.
GETTING EQUITABLE TREATMENT

INTERNATIONAL COALITION FOR AGUNAH RIGHTs (ICAR) was
founded in 1992 and is the only organization that addresses the
agunah problem at the international level. Its membership includes 1.5 million people who are concerned about the plight of
agunot. ICAR's goal is to obtain from distinguished Israeli
rabbis, a halachic solution to the agunah problem that can be
universally implemented.

grew out of a pilot program begun in 1985 by Mark
Bane and Gary Litke, both practicing attorneys in New York
City. Its goal is to educate American Jews about the importance of obtaining a get, and to facilitate the actual delivery of
gittin. Kayama makes all arrangements for the get proceeding
and pays its cost if that is an issue (the administrative expense
of the get proceeding typically costs about $300 dollars). In
1993, the organization sent information regarding the get requirement to over 3,000 members of the matrimonial bar in the
New York metropolitan area.
KAYAMA

COUNCIL OF AMERICA (RCA) is the largest professional organization of Orthodox rabbis in the world. Its
membership includes 980 Orthodox rabbis in the United States,
Canada, Israel and elsewhere. The RCA serves as a spokesman
THE RABBINICAL
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for Orthodoxy on the national and international levels. Its affiliate, the Beth Din of America, services the RCA's membership
and the Jewish community both by administering and processing Jewish divorces (gittin), and by adjudicating and arbitrating
civil litigation.
B:
Sample Prenuptial and Arbitration Agreements Approved by
the Orthodox Caucus
APPENDIX

The following two premarital agreements have been distributed
to thousands of Orthodox Rabbis throughout the United States
in an attempt to resolve the agunah problem.
I.

PRENuPTIA

HusBAND's

AGREEMENT:

ASSUMPTION OF OBLIGATION

I. I, the undersigned,

hereby

obligate

myself to

,

support

my

husband to be,

wife

to

be,

, in the manner of Jewish husbands who

feed and support their wives loyally. If, Heaven forfend, we do
not continue domestic residence together for any reason, then I
obligate myself, as of now, to pay to her $- per day (indexed to
the consumer price index as of December 31st following the date
of marriage) for food and support (parnasa)for the duration of
our Jewish marriage, which is payable each week during the
time due, under any circumstances, even if she has another
source of income or earnings. Furthermore, I waive my halachic rights to my wife's earnings for the period that she is entitled to the above-stipulated sum. However, this obligation
shall terminate if my wife refuses to appear upon due notice
before a Bais Din for purpose of a hearing concerning any outstanding disputes between us, or in the event that she fails to
abide by the decision or recommendation of such Bais Din.
II. The husband to be is executing this document as an inducement to the marriage between the parties. The obligations and
conditions contained herein are executed according to all legal
and halachic requirements. The husband to be acknowledges
that he has effected the above obligation by a kinyan (Jewish
formal transaction) in an esteemed (choshuv) Bais Din.
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III. The husband to be has been given the opportunity prior to
executing this document of consulting with a rabbinic advisor
and a legal advisor.

Signature
Date:
Place:
Witness:

II.

Name:
Address:
Witness:

ARBITRATION AGREEMENT BETWEEN HusBAND AND WIFE

MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT made this
575
, corresponding to the
of
199
,in the City of
day of _,
, between
, State of
, the husband to be, who resides at
, the wife
, and
to be, who resides at
WHEREAS, the aforementioned parties are presently to be
united in matrimony as husband and wife:
THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY AGREED by and between
then that,
day

I. Should a dispute arise between the parties, Heaven forbid,
so that they do not dwell together as husband and wife, then
they will submit their dispute to the herein stipulated Bais Din
for a binding decision. The parties hereby agree to arbitrate all
matters pertinent to any dispute between them, before an arbitration panel, namely, the Bais Din of
Each of the parties agrees to appear in person before the panel
upon the request of the other party. The award or decision of
the panel or a majority of them shall be enforceable in any court
of competent jurisdiction.
II. (a) The parties agree that the Bais Din is authorized to
decide all issues relating to a get (Jewish Divorce) as well as any
and all issues arising from agreements (e.g. kesuba, tena'im) entered into by the husband and the wife.
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(b) The parties agree that the Bais Din is authorized to
decide any monetary disputes that may arise between them, as
well as issues of child support, visitation and custody, if both
parties consent to such inclusion in the arbitration at the time
that the arbitration itself begins.
III. This agreement is recognized as a material inducement to
this marriage by the parties hereto. Failure of either of the parties to voluntarily perform his or her obligations hereunder if
requested to do so by the other party shall render the noncomplying party liable for all costs as shall be awarded by the Bais
Din, including attorneys' fees, reasonably incurred by the requesting party in order to secure the noncomplying party's
performance.
IV. In the event any of the aforementioned Bais Din members
are no longer willing or able to serve, then their successors designated by them, (individually or organizationally), shall serve
in their place and stead. If there are no successors, the parties
will choose a mutually acceptable institutional Bais Din at the
time of arbitration. If no such Bais Din can be agreed upon, the
parties shall each choose one member of the Bais Din and the
two shall then choose the third member. The award or decision
of the Bais Din shall be rendered in accordance with Jewish
Law ("Halakha") and/or the general principles of arbitration
and equity (Pshara) customarily employed by rabbinical
tribunals.
Should at any time there be a division of opinion among the
Dayanim, the award or decision of a majority of the Dayanim
shall be binding. Furthermore, should any of the Dayanim
upon conclusion of the evidence remain in doubt as to the
proper award or decision, resign, withdraw or refuse or become
unable to perform his duties for any reason, the remaining
Dayanim shall render the award or decision and it will be
deemed that of the Bais Din.
In the event of the failure or refusal of either party to appear before it upon reasonable notice, the Bais Din may issue its
decision in default of said party's appearance.
V. This agreement may be executed in one or more counterparts, each one of which shall be deemed an original.
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VI. The signing of this agreement constitutes a full and complete arbitration agreement, required in order to submit the indicated claims to the arbitration tribunal as indicated above.
VI. The parties acknowledge that they have been given the opportunity, prior to executing this document, to consult with a
rabbinic advisor and a legal advisor.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the Bride and Groom have
entered into this Agreement in the City of
, State of

,

U.S.A.

Name:
Address:
Signature:
Witness:

Bride

Name:
Address:
Signature:
Witness:

Groom
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